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Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind 
presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior.   Using all key roll call votes in the 
House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, 
presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and 
success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad.  Evidence 
does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional 
support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters 
after uses of force abroad.  But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to 
hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents’ abilities to influence congressional 






























First and foremost, I would like to thank the honored members of my committee.  
I thank Dr. Greig, the Chair, for always finding the time to allow me to bug him in his 
office, Dr. Meernik for encouraging us students to look at Congress in his Foreign Policy 
class, and Dr. Oldmixon for signing on to help me see my thesis through to the very 
end.  Special thanks also go out to Dr. Richard Stoll of Rice University whose early 
research, comments, and, most importantly, data have been invaluable to this project.  
My sincere thanks also go out to Jynipher and all of my friends for bearing with me and 
lending me their loving support.  Last, but by no means least, to my Mother and Father I 
give my love and heartfelt thanks.  Without your constant encouragement, nudging, and 
financial support this project would never have been completed. 
 
iv 




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
 




1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE................................................................................. 5 
 
2.1 Post-Force Effects-Public Approval and Domestic Factors ................................... 8 
2.2 Policy Constraints and Diversionary Behavior ..................................................... 12 
2.3 Congressional Decision-making and Uses of Force ............................................ 15 
 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ................................................................................. 19 
 
3.1 Presidential Interests and Decision-Making......................................................... 19 
3.2 Congressional Interests and Voting Behavior ...................................................... 22 
3.3 US Foreign Policy, Uses of Force, and Congressional Responses ..................... 24 
3.4 Hypotheses.......................................................................................................... 27 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN................................................................................................ 32 
 
4.1 Measuring the Dependent Variables.................................................................... 32 
4.2 Measuring the Independent Variables ................................................................. 36 
4.3 Methods Discussion............................................................................................. 40 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS....................................................................................... 44 
 
5.1 Summary Statistics and Apparent Trends in the Data ......................................... 45 
5.3 Results and Analysis of Presidential Success ..................................................... 58 
 
6. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 64 
 
APPENDIX A................................................................................................................. 71 
 





LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1.1: Dependent Variable Descriptions................................................................ 72  
 
Table 1.2: Predicted Relationships for Baseline Model Specification,  
House and Senate........................................................................................................ 72 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables,  
House and Senate 1948-1993...................................................................................... 73 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables,  
House and Senate 1948-1993...................................................................................... 73 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Congressional Support for the House  
and Senate, 1948-1993................................................................................................ 73 
 
Table 4.1: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll  
Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM........................................................................................... 74  
 
Table 4.2: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll  
Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM........................................................................................... 75  
 
Table 4.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 7-12............................. 76 
 
Table 5.1: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993  
Probit Estimates............................................................................................................ 77 
 
Table 5.2: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993  
Probit Estimates............................................................................................................ 78 
 
Table 5.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 17-20........................... 79 
 





Since the publication of Stoll’s (1987) seminal piece “The Sounds of the Guns: Is 
there a Congressional Rally Effect after U.S. Military Actions?” his findings that 
Congress does rally for presidents on key international votes after the use of force have 
been widely cited and embraced by the diversionary literature.  However, while the use 
of force research stemming from the work of Ostrom and Job (1986) has evolved into a 
sophisticated research program generating a voluminous amount of scholarship, very 
little research has been done to further examine the domestic effects that occur directly 
after the initiation of force.  The goal of this thesis is to help fill the looming gap in the 
use of force literature by examining two research questions, How does initiating a use of 
force abroad affect presidents’ abilities to obtain support for their legislative positions in 
Congress?  And, do, as Ostrom and Job (1986) contend, U.S. Presidents use their 
constitutionally assigned powers as Commander-in-Chief to translate directly into 
greater personal and political success in their roles as Chief-Executive and party 
leader? 
 Examining whether or not presidents directly capitalize on the use of force in 
Congress is important for two reasons.  First, presidents’ decisions to use force have 
direct implications on U.S. foreign policy and their constituents.  For this reason, it is 
important to know whether presidents choose to use force because it is best for their 
country or for their own personal motives.   In the U.S. foreign policy literature, a 
growing amount of work has been done trying to link U.S. foreign policy decisions to 
2 
domestic political and economic factors instead of international variables.1  The crux of 
this literature’s argument is that presidents actively pursue policies in areas in which 
they have greater control and authority (foreign policy and the military) in order to better 
their political standings at home.  While critics have strongly questioned the diversionary 
literature’s findings from the prospective of presidential opportunities and willingness, 2 
Stoll’s (1987) findings of congressional rally effects deserves a further, more extensive, 
examination.  Confirmation of repeatable congressional rallies across issue areas and 
during the bad times would provide clear and direct evidence for the incentives behind a 
president’s choice to instigate a diversionary use of force.  A strong showing of military 
leadership may be converted into enough political capital for a politically ailing president 
to resurrect his image as a leader in the eyes of the general public and the government.   
Another reason to examine whether members of Congress do rally after uses of 
force centers on the interrelationship between presidents and Congress on policy 
formation.  Within the domestic arena, presidents must actively promote and garner 
legislative victories in order to maintain the public’s perception of competent leadership 
(Neustadt 1960, Richards et. al. 1993).  However, in the Congress literature, a large 
body of work has focused on the powerful role that internal membership forces, like 
party identification, ambition for re-election, and constituent preferences, play in shaping 
                                                 
1 To see examples looking at the effects of unemployment and inflation see Ostrom and Job (1986), 
DeRouen (1995, 2000), and Fordham (1998).  For examples of uses of force due to low or dropping 
presidential approval ratings see Ostrom and Job (1986), Marra et al. (1990), James and Oneal (1991), 
and Morgan and Bickers (1992).   
2 For criticism of the diversionary use of force see Meernik (1994), Meernik and Waterman (1996), and 
Lian and Oneal (1993). 
3 
their legislative decisions; leaving presidents only a small amount of room to exert 
influence.3   
 Out of this Congress centered approach, the presence of rally effects directly 
after uses of force undermine some of the central assertions derived from past 
research.  Congressional rally effects offer the possibility for members of the opposition 
party to actually improve sitting presidents’ standings by lending their support to 
legislation that presidents wish to stop or move through Congress.  This runs contrary to 
the main party identification thesis.  Problems also arise when accounting for the basis 
of the diversionary uses of force.  From this theory, presidents are expected to use force 
abroad as a way of managing their individual problems at home.  However, it is at the 
times when presidents are most vulnerable that the Congress centered thesis argues 
that troubled presidents will be most hindered in their attempts to engender member 
support (e.g. Rudolph 2003; Samuels 2004).  Further research needs to be done in 
order to determine whether presidents should expect greater support after initiating 
uses of force, and do presidents use these expected boosts to their own political 
benefit.  Positive findings for greater presidential success would provide additional 
support for a large body of the diversionary literature; while, contemporaneously, 
contradicting a large body of literature centered on Congress.    
This study will seek to address both issues spelled out above, while 
distinguishing itself from the previous literature.  Employing all uses of force initiated by 
the United States, I analyze the impact of international conflict on congressional voting 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Fiorina (1977), Kingdom (1981), and Aldrich (1995).  Exceptions to this literature have 
focused on the importance of presidential approval on member behavior.  Bond and Fleisher (1990) and 
Edwards (1980), for example, have found evidence that popular presidents are better able to acquire 
deference from members of Congress for their policy positions.   
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behavior for every key roll call vote in the House and Senate where the president has 
taken a position from 1948 to 1993 (Stoll 2006).  Specifically, I examine whether 
presidents are more likely to find greater support and success for their positions in 
Congress from the chamber as a whole, members of the opposition, and their own party 
after initiating uses of force abroad.  I also test whether presidents can directly benefit 
from using force during times of economic and political trouble; times when other widely 
used theories would argue that members should be most divisive.   
In the next chapter, I review the major theoretical arguments of diversionary 
theory and evaluate the theoretical basis for the two main incentives used to explain 
why presidents would be more willing to use force abroad.  Section three represents the 
theoretical portion of the paper where I use previous research to develop the expected 
relationship that links political uses of force with congressional membership voting 
behavior.  Following this discussion, I test hypotheses, derived in Chapter Three, with 
multiple statistical models, to be outlined in Chapter Four.  The results and analyses of 
these models are then reported in Chapter Five.  In final, I summarize the major findings 
drawn from the paper, ending with some concluding remarks on potential avenues for 




 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The notion that U.S. presidents may use international crises in order to improve 
their domestic standings represents an interesting twist in the use of force literature.  
Impetus of much of this research comes from Ostrom and Job’s (1986) classic article, 
“The President and the Political Use of Force.”  Using a cybernetic decision model, they 
argue that in order for U.S. presidents to maintain their roles as Chief-Executive, 
Commander in Chief, and political leader they must incorporate information from the 
“…salient dimensions in the domestic, international, and political arenas” into their 
foreign policy decision-making (1986 pp.555).  The authors find that domestic factors 
involving presidential approval ratings and presidential success have stronger 
correlations with the use of force than international factors.  Their findings also offer the 
first empirical evidence that presidents may choose to initiate acts of force abroad in 
response to troubled times at home.4  Scholarly works from James and Oneal (1991) 
and DeRouen (1995 & 2000) have also found strong connections between fluctuations 
in presidential approval ratings and likelihood of the use of force.5 
Other scholars have employed a more refined approach to diversionary theory.  
Morgan and Bickers (1992) find evidence that presidents are more likely to use 
diversionary behavior in-order to rally dwindling support from within their own parties.  
Such findings are consistent with that of public opinion research that has founds that 
                                                 
4 Ironically, they also find that presidents are more likely to use force when their public approval rating is 
high.  The coefficient for this variable is larger than that of the other domestic variables, and is found to be 
just as significant.     
5 These studies differ some on their unit of analysis. Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) 
look at fluctuations in the presidents public approval ratings as a whole, while Morgan and Bickers (1992) 
look at the effect of falling approval ratings within the presidents own party.  DeRouen (2000) does not 
look at when force is most likely, but instead is focusing on what level of force should be expected based 
on the presidents’ approval ratings at home.      
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individuals already predisposed to a president, such as his co-partisans, are the most 
likely to rally to his support during times of crisis (e.g. Tami and Swenson 1997).  But, a 
recent reassessment of Morgan and Bickers’ (1992) findings by Foster and Palmer 
(2006) has challenged their central hypothesis.  Using an extended data set of US 
conflicts, as well as more sophisticated methodological techniques, Foster and Palmer 
find that presidents are more likely to respond to declines in overall approval; reaffirming 
findings from above.    
Studies by Ostrom and Job (1987), James and Oneal (1991) and Wang (1996) 
have also found strong correlations between U.S. economic performance and the 
likelihood that presidents will use force.6  Using an economic misery index that accounts 
for the effect of inflation, unemployment, and issue salience among the public, all three 
works find that presidents are more likely to use force during times of economic turmoil.  
In later work, Fordham (1998a; 1998b) disaggregates the weighted misery index into 
separate unemployment and inflation rate variables to measure economic performance.  
Looking at uses of force from 1949-1994, he finds that unemployment has played a 
significant role in predicting when presidents will choose to use force (1998a).  Fordham 
(1998b) then explores the relationship between presidential party affiliations and 
responses to different economic indicators.  Examining presidential decision-making 
across administrations, he finds that Republican presidents are more likely to use force 
during times of high employment, while Democrats are more likely to use force at time 
of high inflation. These findings were later re-tested and re-affirmed by Clark (2003).   
                                                 
6 DeRouen (1995), not mentioned above, also finds links between the misery index and use of force, but 
only indirectly through affects on presidential approval ratings.   
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Despite the cumulating evidence of diversionary behavior, strong criticisms have 
been made on the influences domestic factors have on uses of force abroad.  Both 
Meernik (1994) and Meernik and Waterman (1996) argue that much of the diversionary 
literature is guilty of selection bias; causing previous findings to only appear significant.  
By changing the unit of analysis to the opportunities to use force, instead of when force 
actually occurs, they argue that it provides a greater understanding of how and when 
domestic factors influence presidential decisions to use force.  After accounting for 
these missing observations, they both find that none of the domestic factors linked to 
uses of force above are found to be significant, contrary to the findings to the 
diversionary literature.   
While the narrative of a politically ailing president using force abroad to 
manipulate his standings at home is appealing at a theatrical level, the evidence 
presented above only represents a portion of the whole story.  In fact, the majority of the 
diversionary literature has presented the tale of presidential subterfuges in foreign policy 
in medias res; 7 with little evidence or examination of what came before or directly after 
the decision to use force.  This presents a clear problem with the current literature, 
because, as Meernik (1994) points out at the end of his piece, “We need to begin by 
identifying the domestic and international costs and benefits of using force in order to 
explain why Presidents use force” (902).8  Though Ostrom and Jobs’ (1986) 
observations are correct in pointing out that the multi-faceted roles of US presidents 
offer them the unique position to pursue diversionary behavior, the same multi-faceted 
                                                 
7 The term “in medias res” is a literary term used to describe a specific oratory and writing style where the 
author begins a story in the middle of the sequence of events that make-up the narrative.  Actions that 
occur prior to the story’s begin scenes are typically revealed as the plot progresses. 
8 Emphasis in original. 
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role offers modern presidents a plethora of other viable policy options at the same time 
(see Most and Starr, 1984).  Because the diversionary literature focuses, almost 
entirely, on when presidents are most likely to use force, it has failed to account for the 
future benefits that have been assumed to make presidents more willing to pursue 
diversionary behavior.  Until we have gained a greater understanding of the expected 
post-use of force domestic effects, we should seriously question the theoretical rationale 
behind why a politically ailing president would be more willing to instigate the use of 
force over other possible actions.    
2.1 Post-Force Effects-Public Approval and Domestic Factors   
The most widely used variant of diversionary theory posits that when presidents 
have fallen under ‘hard times’ at home, they will resort to using military force abroad in 
order to manipulate public opinion into their corners.  As DeRouen (2000) points out, 
“Implicit in the diversionary theory is a short-term boost in presidential approval known 
as the rally effect” (317).9  Relating back to the previous section, this expected rally 
effect represents the primary future benefits that presidents wish to receive by 
undertaking diversionary behavior.  However, even though a great deal of work has 
focused on examining the influence of domestic factors on U.S. foreign policy, post-
force domestic benefits have been typically represented as a given. Since these post-
force benefits represent the major theoretical justifications behind diversionary behavior, 
this assumption may be premature.  A review of the relevant literature provides 
contradictory findings, and, when considering diversionary behavior, it calls into 
question whether rally effects should be considered as reified post-force phenomena. 
                                                 
9 Emphasis mine. 
9 
The theoretical foundations that make-up the common theory presented in much 
of the diversionary literature can be attributed to the work of past studies in sociology 
and psychology looking at internal group behavior.  From theses studies (see Simmel 
1955; Coser 1956) scholars have found evidence that the perceived presence of a 
shared common enemy increases a group’s cohesion.  Though these studies only 
looked at group behavior on a small scale, many of the same characteristics and 
findings have been found to be applicable to the populations of states.  Within the use of 
force literature, Mueller (1973) was the first to operationalize and directly study the 
relationship between presidential approval ratings and uses of force.  His findings show 
that presidents tend to receive an ephemeral positive post-use of force jump in 
popularity before eventually declining to pre-force levels.10 This natural group formation 
stands as the cornerstone upon which much of the diversionary literature predicts that 
presidents will choose to use force abroad in order to improve their situation at home.   
However, recent findings on U.S. public opinion have found that the posited 
determined relationship between the use of force abroad and higher levels of approval 
are much more complicated than diversionary theory suggests.  Jentleson (1992) and 
Jentleson and Britton (1998) find that the U.S. public is “pretty prudent” on how it 
responds to different policies promoted abroad.  Missions involving humanitarian 
interventions and checks on foreign acts of aggression are found to have much higher 
levels -double digit differences- of public support than missions involving regime change 
and state-building exercises.11  These findings show that public opinion can show both 
positive and negative approval for the same issue depending on the mission’s 
                                                 
10 Subsequent works by Lee (1977) and Huckley (1988) have confirmed these findings. 
11 See, for example, Oneal, Lian, and Joyner (1996).  They find that the American public has been 
consistently supportive of the use of military force against foreign acts of aggression from 1950-1988.   
10 
objectives.  Findings by Nincic (1997) also provide evidence that public opinion on 
foreign policy issues can vary across specific demographics.  Different factors, like 
inflation and unemployment, affect different sectors of the public unequally; presenting 
the possibility that a specific portion of the country’s population may choose to either 
support or oppose certain foreign policy issues based solely on the domestic and 
political environment unique to that time.12  Such predictable variations in support lend 
further credence to evidence showing (see Hurtwitz and Peffley 1987) that public 
opinion concerning foreign affairs is structured and greatly resistant to outside 
manipulation.  All together, these findings show that presidents must account for a 
greater range of domestic and political factors when dealing with the public; making it 
much harder for them to manipulate public support as theorized.   
 Despite the difficulty of predicting public reaction, diversionary scholars have 
found evidence that uses of force -even during tumultuous times- do lead to rallies in 
public approval for presidents.  Marra et al. (1990) find that both major and minor uses 
of force in major areas of the world can lead to boosts in approval by 5.40 and 1.08 
points, respectively.  They also find that the coefficient on their foreign environment 
variable has the largest effect on public opinion out of the four variables that are under 
presidential control.  DeRouen (1995; 2000) uses a simultaneous system of equations 
model to analyze the indirect effects of domestic economic variables on presidential 
approval as well as the initiation of a militarized disputes.  He finds a recursive linkage 
between public approval and uses of force where low approval ratings lead to conflicts 
of higher intensity which then lead to rises in overall approval (1995 pp 687-689).  Later, 
                                                 
12 This line of thinking fits with Fordham’s (1998b) and Clark’s (2003) findings of partisan differences and 
uses of force.   
11 
DeRouen (2000) finds that both initiation of force and level of force significantly affect 
presidential approval.    
 Critics of diversionary theory have countered supportive findings with public 
opinion and presidential approval evidence of their own.  Brody and Shapiro (1989) find 
in their study of 45 situations where an expected rally event should occur that the 
president’s approval ratings actually went down 20% of the time.  Lian and Oneal (1993) 
look at public opinion, presidential popularity, and uses of force by the United States 
from 1950 through 1984.  From their model they find that the mean improvement in 
presidential popularity after a crisis and use of force comes out to be 0.  They also find 
that the uses of force that receive the most public exposure in the media tend to 
increase the presidents’ approval ratings only by 2-3 points.  This lends considerable 
doubt to the assumed benefit that presidents are expecting to receive by using force 
abroad.  DeRouen and Peake (2002) obtain similar findings when they test the 
president’s ability to change the overall agenda of the U.S. public.  Using vector 
autoregression (VAR), they find that the impact of uses of force do not effect 
presidential approval beyond the 95% degree of confidence barrier.  But, they found 
presidents to be able to divert the public’s attention away from possible domestic 
problems for up-to four months.13   
 Going by the evidence presented in the literature, whether or not presidents 
receive the rally effects that many diversionary scholars expect is still inconclusive.  
From the evidence, presidents should expect a possible rally of public approval after a 
                                                 
13 This ability may fit well with Fordham’s (1998a) assertion that diversionary behavior may be a way of 
approval stabilization.  While the president’s approval rate does not go up, it does remain stable after the 
public attention is diverted.  It is impossible to know whether the president’s approval rating would have 
continued to go down or stabilized if he had not used force abroad.    
12 
use of force.  However, whether such a rally will be large enough to save them from 
their political problems is anyone’s guess.  This problem cuts to the heart of one of the 
main incentives used to justify the diversionary narrative.  If presidents are unable to 
really benefit from the uses of force, then they should not be expected to expend limited 
resources to pay for expensive military actions at a dire hour in their presidencies.  In 
order to justify the inherent costs of using force abroad, a clearer and more visible form 
of incentive must be found.   
2.2 Policy Constraints and Diversionary Behavior 
A second, less common, incentive presented in the diversionary literature posits 
that state leaders are more likely to use force abroad in order to display or re-affirm their 
positions of leadership at home.  Such explanations have steered away from the use of 
post-force “rallies” as the sole justification for leadership decision-making while 
incorporating more of an institutional element into their theoretical narrative.  For 
example, Richards et. al. (1993) pose that state leaders are more likely to divert the 
public’s attention in order to further establish records of competent leadership.  The 
perception of competent leadership is assumed to be highly salient to the public’s 
decision to retain leaders; providing more of a long-term benefit than any ephemeral 
rally-around-the-flag effects that may occur.  Diversionary behavior serves as a way that 
state leaders are able manipulate the institutional mechanisms that determine whether 
they will remain in their positions of authority.    
 Other scholars have argued that diversionary behavior is a means by which state 
leaders can act when otherwise constrained from pursuing other viable policy options 
(see Most and Starr 1984).  Fitting this explanation, state leaders have been found to be 
13 
more likely to use force when other policy options are institutionally blocked or are 
unavailable to be implemented at their discretion (e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 
1995; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; Brulé 2006).  This represents a clear shift from previous 
scholarship that emphasized rally effects as the main incentive for state leaders to divert 
the public’s attention.  The over reliance on such an incentive-based explanation has 
relegated diversionary behavior as a symptom of democratic politics.  Autocratic 
leaders, whose political authority and power does not emanate from the general 
population, do not have the same need to maintain their public’s approval.  Such 
leaders have the option to utilize more coercive means at their disposal to remain in 
power (see,e.g, Bueno de Mesquita 1980; Davenport 1994,1999; Davies 2002).  
However, all state leaders, democratic or not, are susceptible to some form of policy 
constraints, offering a common incentive for state leaders to use diversionary behavior 
across all regime types. 
 Out of this re-conceptualization of leadership decision-making, multiple cross-
national studies have been performed to determine whether diversionary behavior is a 
generalizable phenomena among all, or a select subset, states within the international 
system (e.g. Gelpi 1997; Leeds and Davis 1997; Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Miller 
1995; 1999; Davies 2002).  The overall findings for these cross-national studies are 
mixed.  Some scholars (see, Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002) contend that the diversionary 
thesis is only relevant when discussing leadership decision-making for well-established 
democracies.14  States where the political leaderships are most constrained in what 
                                                 
14In their study of 18 advanced industrialized democracies, Leeds and Davis (1997) find no support for a 
relationship between political constraints and international behavior.  They also find that politically 
constrained leaders are less likely to receive international demands.  The authors argue that these 
findings present evidence of strategic behavior by external actors to avoid the higher possibility of conflict 
14 
policies they are able to pursue.  Work by Miller (1996, 1999) presents evidence of the 
exact opposite relationship.  He finds that autocratic states are more likely to act 
aggressively abroad during times of economic and political vulnerability than democratic 
states.   
One argument put forward to explain contradictory findings across democratic 
states involves institutional variations that present different forms of institutional 
constraints on the executive, there by generating differences in conflict behavior.  Some 
scholars (see e.g. Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; see also Clark and 
Norstrom 2005) have argued that regimes where actors, other than the chief executive, 
play a definitive role in shaping the state’s foreign policy are much less likely to initiate 
foreign conflicts and wars.  To this effect, Auerswald (2000) posits that presidents have 
greater freedom to direct and act on foreign policy matters than their parliamentary 
system counterparts who must directly rely on membership support.  Therefore, 
presidential systems, including the US, should be more likely to use force abroad.  
However, multiple empirical tests conducted do not bare this relationship out (Reiter and 
Tilman 2002; Clark and Norstrom 2005).  In the case of the US, empirical evidence has 
found that the presence of divided government and a strong congressional opposition 
in-directly constrains presidents’ international behavior by providing possible post-force 
costs that limit president abilities to pursue their legislative agendas (see, Clark 2000; 
Howell and Pevehouse 2005).     
 The separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches 
causes presidents to be highly susceptible to institutional constraints due to their limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
with vulnerable leaders.  Similar strategic target avoidance arguments have also been made by Smith 
(1996) and Clark (2002).       
15 
abilities to unilaterally implement domestic policies.  Brulé (2006) argues that presidents 
facing a divided Congress and a unified opposition are much more constrained in their 
abilities to pass policies that would address domestic economic troubles.15  Accounting 
for interaction effects, he finds that presidents facing economic troubles at home are 
much more likely to use force abroad when constrained by strong congressional 
opposition versus times of unified, consensual, government.  Such evidence displays 
the importance of considering other institutions, especially Congress, when developing 
theories involving leadership decision-making and the diversionary use of force.   
2.3 Congressional Decision-making and Uses of Force 
One avenue in dire need of further study is what direct effects uses of force 
abroad have on congressional voting behavior, and whether such impacts represent an 
incentive for presidents to employ diversionary behavior.  In a widely cited article, Stoll 
(1987) finds evidence that members of Congress are more likely to support the 
president’s position on key-international votes directly after foreign military actions.16   
He attributes these repeating boosts in congressional support to two distinct influences: 
constituents’ opinions and congressional rally effects.  
Through the first influence, Stoll argues that the surges in public opinion 
predicted to occur directly after the initiation of force affect the level of support members 
of Congress will grant presidents.  “…[S]ince the general public will rise to support the 
president, any opposition by a member of Congress will be at odds with the feelings of 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards and Barrett 2000.   
16 Looking at “Internationalism” in Congress, Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) also find evidence that uses of 
force abroad increase the likelihood that presidents will be successful at promoting their international 
policies in Congress.   In both the House and Senate, the number of militarized disputes observed in the 
previous month significantly increased the probability that presidents’ international policies would be 
supported by each chamber of Congress.   
16 
her or his constituents,” says Stoll (225).  Essentially, this represents an extension and 
indirect by-product of the rally-around-the-flag effects predicted within much of the 
diversionary literature.  Failure by members to show support for a popular president 
during times of crisis may result in their constituents seeking retribution in the future.  
These assertions match well with those found in the Congress literature that finds that 
high and surging levels of public approval can, essentially, be traded for political capital 
in Congress (see, e.g., River and Rose 1985; Light 1999).   
The second - more interesting - influence that Stoll links to congressional 
behavior after uses of force comes from rallies that occur among member of Congress.  
He astutely points out that just because members of Congress are elected officials, it 
does not mean that they are immune to displaying the same rally behavior that has 
been observed from the general public.  Presented with an international crisis, members 
would be subject to the same psychological in-group/out-group forces addressed by the 
public opinion literature cited above. The perceived presence of a common external 
enemy, presented by the use of force, predicts that there will be greater cohesion within 
Congress.  This greater cohesion translates into congressional rallies similar to those 
found by previous research in the public sphere.17 However, while public rally effects 
can only be detected through increases in presidential approval, rallying members of 
Congress are able to show higher levels of support for presidents through their 
legislative voting decisions.  As a result, Stoll finds that presidents’ positions on key 
international votes are more likely to be supported directly after uses of force abroad. 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Mueller (1973), Lee (1977) and Huckley (1988). 
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While the arguments presented by Stoll are compelling, we should not rush too 
quickly to the impression that changes in congressional voting behavior represents a 
clear incentive for presidents to use diversionary behavior.  An essential part of the 
diversionary narrative entails that presidents undergo diversionary behavior in order to 
save their administrations from domestic troubles.  Unfortunately, Stoll’s (1987) piece 
fails to account or control for any of the domestic factors, unemployment, inflation rate, 
and public approval, which have been associated with either helping or hindering 
presidents’ abilities to effectively pursue their legislative agendas.18  At present, the 
evidence that is presented by Stoll is only able to give the reader a narrow view of what 
kind of behavior presidents should expect from Congress after the use of force.    
Another point of concern is Stoll’s self-imposed limitation of only looking at 
congressional behavior in regards to key international votes.  When deriving his 
hypotheses for his model, he justifies this limitation by arguing that it would be very hard 
for either influence to be linked to other domestic issues.  However, within the 
diversionary literature, much of diversionary behavior’s appeal centers on presidents 
being able to use their international actions to engender positive domestic effects.  From 
the diversionary theorist perspective, the presence of one or both of these influences 
presents the possibility that members of Congress will show greater support to 
presidents across all policy areas.  This would allow presidents to use aggressive 
foreign policy in order to improve their leadership positions through both international 
and domestic key votes. Evidence of this would suggest that manipulating 
                                                 
18 Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) do account for domestic variables such as presidential popularity, 
unemployment, and inflation in their model.  While these control variables (except for presidential 
popularity) are found to be significant and going in the appropriate direction, the number of militarized 
disputes in the previous month is still found to be a statistically positive predictor of presidential success 
on international votes in Congress.    
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congressional behavior does represent clear incentives for presidents to use 
diversionary behavior.   
From this review, we see evidence showing that domestic factors, in some way, 
are related to presidential decisions to use force.  However, exactly what is driving 
presidents to rely on diversionary behavior remains murky.  In the following sections, I 
will try to relieve these deficiencies.  First, I use existing theories found in the literature 
to develop a generalizable theoretical relationship between the initiation of a violent 
interstate conflict and congressional voting behavior that provide incentives for 
presidents to act aggressively abroad.  Then, I examine whether presidents are better 
able to promote their policy positions in Congress after initiating force abroad.  
Affirmative evidence that uses of force lead to greater presidential support and success 
in Congress provides clear incentives for why presidents would undergo diversionary 
behavior.  It also allows me to begin to determine whether presidents who choose to 








THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Since the work of Ostom and Job (1986) over twenty years ago, diversionary 
theorists have clearly scripted the storyline of a politically ailing president using force 
abroad to improve his position at home.  This theoretical tale has been told and re-told 
so many times in the literature that the basic under-lying narrative does not need to be 
re-addressed here.  Instead, I intend to build off of previous research that has examined 
the role of policy/institutional constraints on leaders’ decisions to use force abroad (see, 
e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Richard et. al. 1993; Davies 2002; Brulé 2006) by shifting 
the focus of this study to the post-force effects that occur within Congress -the primary 
institutional constraint of the Executive Branch- and their possible impact on presidential 
decision-making.  By re-focusing the unit of analysis away from measures of 
presidential approval to key roll call votes in Congress, I distinguish myself from past 
research by presenting a clear new incentive for why presidents would be willing to 
undergo diversionary behavior –to obtain greater presidential support and success in 
Congress. 
3.1 Presidential Interests and Decision-Making 
 All presidents are political animals who possess specific goals that they wish to 
obtain during their tenure in office.  Research on the presidency has broken-down these 
presidential goals into three distinct ambitions: winning reelection, implementing 
favorable policies, and securing their presidential legacy (Light 1999).  Though 
separate, in many ways these three goals are intrinsically intertwined.  For example, in 
order for presidents to be reelected they must first promote and help enact policies that 
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will cause their constituents to look back positively on their first term of office; thus 
retaining their leadership for a second term (see, e.g. Fiorina 1981; Richards et, al, 
1993).  As pointed out by Ostrom and Job (1986), presidents, from their positions of 
authority, fill multiple roles within the government as Chief Executive, Commander-in-
Chief, and party leader.   Each of these leadership roles presents presidents with 
unique opportunities to actively pursue their vested interests.  
  One area of chief interest to modern presidents is the maintenance of their 
public approval ratings.  Crespi (1980) and Hodgson (1980) argue that presidential 
approval ratings have come to serve as a pseudo-confidence vote among the public 
concerning the president’s ability to effectively govern.  For presidents, such ratings can 
be used as a source of congressional influence or contention depending on their 
popularity.  Popular presidents are significantly more likely to influence members’ voting 
behavior as well as present bold legislative agendas to Congress (Rivers and Rose 
1985; Brace and Hinckley 1992; also see Light 1999).  
 The strongest determinant of presidential popularity has been found to be the 
public perception of the president’s stewardship of the nation’s economy (e.g. Nincci 
and Hinckley 1991).  Those presidents that are perceived to be effective managers, as 
well as those that have served during times of economic expansion, are much more 
likely to be reelected (Erikson 1989; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).  Such 
electoral incentives insure that, during times of economic trouble, presidents are 
compelled to act or face greater public scrutiny of their leadership abilities (Richards et. 
al. 1993).   
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Managing the economy, for example, requires the president to exert 
substantial influence over the Congress whose “power of the purse” grants 
them jurisdiction over the major components of fiscal policy.  Similarly, 
domestic program innovation demands that considerable time and 
resources be directed towards Capitol Hill (Light 1982).  In general, these 
tasks require a legislative strategy and the consent of Congress. (Marra 
et. al 1990 pp 591) 
Unfortunately, presidents’ reliance on Congress severely limits exactly what policy 
initiatives they are able to implement.  Such limitations leave presidents vulnerable to 
public discontent when they are in greatest need of legislative influence.   
 It is in such dire situations that presidents are found to use alternate means at 
their disposal to shape domestic policies (see e.g., DeRouen and Heo 2000; Mayer 
2001).  Such actions lay at the heart of diversionary theory, where presidents, 
constrained in what actions they are able take, are predicted to be more likely to use 
force abroad (see e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; 
Brulé 2006).  While the common conceptualizations of diversionary theory would posit 
that presidents choose to use force to garner rally effects among the domestic public or 
as a means of displaying their prowess as leaders, presidents are, here, assumed to 
pursue policy options that are at their disposal to seek external –international- solutions 
to their domestic problems.  Presidents are assumed to use force abroad in order to 
obtain greater support for their policy positions in Congress19, there-by loosening the 
constraints on their abilities to act in the future.  Congressional rallies of support are 
                                                 
19 This line of reasoning represents an expansion on previous predictions by Stoll (1987) and Meernik and 
Oldmixon (2004) that Congress is more likely to vote in favor of international legislation directly after 
uses of force abroad.   
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linked to multiple influences originating from both in and outside of Congress; leaving 
open the possibility for strategically minded presidents a wider array of opportunities to 
manipulate members of Congress to their own ends.   
3.2 Congressional Interests and Voting Behavior  
 Much like their presidential counterparts, members of Congress are goal oriented 
individuals who wish to remain in office (Feno 1973; Mayhew 1974).  To meet this goal, 
members must pay careful attention to the opinions and view points expressed by their 
constituents back home.  Mayhew (1974) finds that the primary reason that constituents 
vote for specific members is because they believe that they share similar preferences in 
regards to partisan ideology and policy.  Thus, members must act in ways that show 
that they are not “out of step” with their core base of support.  Members must shift their 
positions with shifts in public opinion or the make-up of their constituencies (e.g. Bartels 
1991; see also Jones and McDermott 2004).  Otherwise, they may be subject to greater 
public scrutiny come reelection time. 
One of the strongest determinants of members’ voting behavior comes from their 
partisan identification (see e.g., Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995).  Political 
parties present members and their constituents with the ability to quickly identify 
individuals with similar policy preferences. This easy and reliable identification method 
allows members to collaborate together in order to formulate and pass legislation that 
meets their shared political preferences.20  Similarly, members of the same party as the 
president are much more likely to support his policy preferences when it comes time to 
                                                 
20 Aldrich (1995) argues that lack of political parties in the first two Congresses resulted in clear social 
choice problems. Stable coalitions of independent voters were very hard to maintain causing very little 
legislation to be passed.  The formation of political parties presented a solution to the stability crises by 
presenting members of Congress with clear distinguishable organizations of like-minded members.   
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vote, while members of the opposing party, who possess their own preferences and 
party loyalties, are much more likely to voice opposition to the  president’s positions 
(e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989).  This divisive partisan relationship 
between Congress and the presidency has been found to be especially strong when the 
control of both braches is divided along partisan lines.  During these times of divided 
government, members of the majority party in Congress will actively oppose the sitting 
president’s policies (see e.g., Fiorina 1996; Binder 1999; Krause 2000). 21  In some 
cases, members may intentionally oppose presidential policy proposals, even to the 
detriment of their own constituents, in order to engender discontent among the public 
towards the president’s inability to address their problems (Mayhew 1974 pp. 29-30).      
Members must also be attentive to their constituents’ opinions concerning 
presidential job performance.  Studies of changes in the partisan-composition of 
Congress (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Marra and Ostrom 1989) have found links between 
presidential popularity and partisan-composition of Congress.  Members belonging to 
the same party as the sitting president can be more or less likely to be reelected 
depending on the administration popularity among the general public (see e.g., 
Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Campbell 1993; Jacobson 1997; see also, Fiorina 1983; 
Stein 1990).  The presidential ‘coat-tails’ effect can vary significantly by how much co-
partisan members vote along or against unpopular presidents’ policies.  Members that 
are able to distance themselves by voting against presidential policies or pursuing their 
own counter-legislative agendas are more likely to be viewed favorably by their 
                                                 
21 For an opposing view, see Mayhew (1994).  Edward, Barrett, and Peake (1997) find that more 
significant legislation fails during times of divided government versus unified government.  But, at the 
same time, no significant relationship between divided government and how much significant legislation 
presidents support and get passed through Congress.   
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constituents than those that simply defer to presidential proposals (Brady, Canes-
Wrone, and Cogan 2000; Brady et. al. 1996; also see Gronke et. al. 2003; Jones and 
McDermott 2004).  Such actions represent strategic decision-making on the part of 
members of Congress in order to maximize their approval levels in the eyes of their 
constituents.   
3.3 US Foreign Policy, Uses of Force, and Congressional Responses  
 Normally, administrations serving during times of divided government and strong 
congressional opposition are less likely to use force abroad.  These findings have been 
indirectly linked to the negative post-force effects presidents would incur from a, then, 
hostile opposition Congress (see Schultz 1998; Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 
2005).  However, it is during times of trouble, when presidents are expected to have the 
least influence in Congress and the least congressional support for their policies, that 
they are predicted to be the most likely to employ aggressive foreign policies (e.g. 
Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 1995; 1997; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002).  In fact, Brulé 
(2006) argues that if the risks of negative congressional post-force actions are less than 
the possible benefits of a foreign policy success, presidents will look abroad for their 
own political answers. 
 In order to best assure that they obtain benefits from the international arena, 
presidents must actively pursue more than just new policies abroad.  Presidential 
actions abroad must be able to garner the public’s attention and support, while also 
remaining viable policy options that can be utilized when most needed.  To sufficiently 
meet both of these requirements, presidents wield their country’s foreign policy 
apparatuses to act as the aggressors abroad.  Assertively pursuing the US’s interests, 
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presidents are able to respond to domestic troubles at home by initiating conflicts with 
other external actors.  They are also able to draw the public’s attention by initiating 
conflicts abroad in which the US eventually uses violent force.  Violent international 
crises, as described, have repeatedly been found to lead displays of support and minor 
boosts in presidential approval among the general public (see Marra et. al 1990; Oneal 
Lian and Joyner 1996).  When confronted with these diversionary presidential actions, 
how are members of Congress expected to respond?  
 Congressional scholars have long pointed out that the dual roles constitutionally 
assigned to presidents have given them greater influence in Congress on matters of 
foreign policy and defense (Wildavsky 1966; Fleisher and Bond 1988).  But, faced with 
such a visible action of presidential leadership and power as the use of force abroad, 
members of Congress must form some kind of coherent response in return.22  Meernik 
(1995) finds that one of the strongest determinants of whether or not members of 
Congress vote to enact the War Powers Resolution or other legislation to curtail military 
actions abroad is public opinion.  After uses of force, members will look to how their 
constituents respond for cues on how they themselves should react to the president’s 
actions.  The presence or expectation of possible rally effects among members’ 
constituents (Mueller. 1973, Lee. 1977, and Huckley. 1988) should directly influence 
their behavior in regards to the president as well (see e.g. Bartels 1991; see also Jones 
and McDermott 2004).  While members’ constituents can openly declare their support 
for the president in many different ways, the clearest way that individual members can 
                                                 
22 Even though the traditional responsibilities of foreign policy have fallen on the shoulders of the 
president, Lindsay and Ripley (1992) stress that since the 70’s Congress has actively tried to reassert 
itself into U.S defense and foreign policy formation.  Meernik (1993) finds evidence that Congress 
dramatically changed its voting behavior in concern to matters of defense and foreign policy after the 
Vietnam War. 
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echo such support is through their ability to vote on up-coming legislation.  Failure to 
account for such reversals in presidential standings or openly opposing highly popular 
presidents can cause members to face long-term problems from the public in reaching 
their goal of re-election.  In order to avoid such political career ending set-backs, 
members of Congress are expected, on average, to parallel their constituents’ reactions 
by showing higher levels of support for presidents’ policies shortly after uses of force 
abroad.   
 Beyond shifts in their constituents’ opinions, members of Congress are also able 
to show rallies of support for presidential actions.  From the previous section, Stoll’s 
(1987) findings that members of Congress show higher levels of support for presidents 
on key international votes shortly after uses of force abroad, provides some initial 
evidence for the presence of congressional rallies.  Essentially, Stoll bases his 
arguments on the same assumptions on group behavior made within the diversionary 
literature.23  Members of Congress are not so different from the general public that we 
should expect that they will not encounter the same inner-group forces that lead to 
rushes of patriotism felt by average citizens.   
 Apparent asymmetrical differences in information between presidents and 
Congress during international crises also increase the likelihood of congressional rallies.  
Because much of the information that members receive about crises comes from 
departments under the authority of the president, it would be difficult for members of 
Congress to quickly obtain enough information to justify openly opposing a president’s 
foreign initiatives (Brody, 1983. cited by Stoll, 1987 pp. 225, see also Schlesinger 1989; 
Meernik 1995).  Evidence has also shown that individuals who have a greater 
                                                 
23 See, Marra et. al (1990) & DeRouen (2000).  
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awareness of the initiation of force are more likely to rally in response (Edwards & 
Swenson 1997).24  Because members of Congress are government officials, some 
sitting on congressional committees dealing specifically with international and military 
affairs, they are more likely to be aware of the policies being instituted by the 
government.   
 These post-force effects present the constraints of congressional decision-
making and voting behavior in a new light.  While normally members are expected to be 
less likely, especially across party lines, to follow the lead of a politically ailing president, 
the presence of congressional rally effects would insure membership solidarity.  Much 
like the greater group cohesion predicted by Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) in the 
past, strong partisan influences on members’ decision-making are expected to briefly 
diminish.  At the same time, members in greater numbers are expected to temporarily 
direct their support to the president as the head of their new unified front.  Thus, we 
should expect members to be more disposed to presidential influences, directly 
translating into higher levels of congressional support and greater presidential success 
in Congress.  
3.4 Hypotheses 
 Congressional Rallies. Working from the previous observations that members of 
groups that face a common enemy experience greater group cohesion25, I argue that 
members of Congress, should, for a period of time, rally to the President’s side after the 
use of force.26  From their unique position as elected legislators within the United States 
government, members of Congress are uniquely able to display their feelings of 
                                                 
24 Though minute, similar evidence has been found by Lian and Oneal (1993) 
25 See, for example, Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956). 
26 See, for example, Stoll (1987); Meernik and Oldmixon (2004).  Also see Muller (1973). 
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solidarity behind the president by affording him greater amounts of congressional 
support on legislation.  These effects should be found shortly after the initial use of 
force, and then are expected to quickly deteriorate as other domestic and foreign 
matters become salient to both the general public and to Congress.  Thus, I expect a 
positive relationship between uses of force and congressional support for the 
president’s policy positions.   I also expect that the impact of force on members’ voting 
behavior is temporary, and diminishes over time.   
H1a: Members of Congress will demonstrate greater support for the 
president’s policy positions on key roll call votes shortly after the initiation 
of a use of force abroad.    
H1b: Presidents are more likely to be successful in getting their policy 
positions passed through Congress shortly after the initiation of a use of 
force abroad. 
H2a: Members of Congress, after initial rallies, will demonstrate less 
support for the president’s policy positions on key roll call votes over time. 
H2b: Presidents, after initial rallies, are less likely to be successful in 
getting their policy positions passed through Congress on key roll call 
votes over time. 
 
 Partisan Behavior. One of the strongest indicators found within the congressional 
literature of determining how members will decide on key roll call votes is their party 
identification (see. Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995).  However, I argue that in 
the wake of a use of force abroad, members of Congress, as predicted in the rally-
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around-the-flag literature, will respond with greater group cohesion.  Perceiving a 
common external enemy, members will be more likely to work together to support the 
president in order to maintain the appearance of group solidarity.  Thus, we should 
expect a positive relationship between uses of force and support for the president’s 
policy position from the congressional membership of both the president’s party and the 
opposition.   We should also expect that the impact of uses of force on each group’s 
membership should be temporary, and that its impact should diminish over time.   
H3a: Members of Congress belonging to the president’s party will 
demonstrate greater support for the president’s policy positions on key 
roll call votes shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.   
 H3b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the 
president will demonstrate greater support for the president’s policy 
positions on key roll call votes shortly after the initiation of a use of force 
abroad.    
H4a: Members of Congress belonging to the president’s party, after initial 
rallies, will demonstrate less support for the president’s policy positions 
on key roll call votes over time. 
H4b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the 
president, after initial rallies, will demonstrate less support for the 
president’s policy positions on key roll call votes over time. 
 
 Presidential Authority.  Within the congressional literature, scholars have found 
some evidence that presidents’ constitutionally assigned roles as head of the state’s 
military and chief diplomat have given them greater authority to direct and influence 
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policies that fall under their scope of power, such as matters of foreign policy and 
defense.27  The effects of this asymmetrical influence would even be more pronounced 
shortly after the use of force where international issues were involved, and the 
executive is in control of the major information collecting bodies within the federal 
government (Stoll 1987; see also Meernik and Oldmixon 2004).  At these times, 
members of Congress will be dependent on the Executive branch to supply them with 
information in order to make their decisions.  This places the president at a distinct 
advantage in promoting their policies, which makes it more likely that members will 
defer to the president’s judgment.  Therefore, presidents should be expected to have a 
greater ability to exert their influence on Congress after a use of force in areas where 
they have greater Constitutional authority, specifically legislation concerning foreign 
policy and defense.  
H5a: Members of Congress will demonstrate greater support for the 
president’s policy positions on key roll call votes involving the military and 
foreign affairs than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after 
the initiation of a use of force abroad. 28  
H5b: Presidents are more likely to be successful in getting their policy 
positions passed on key votes involving the military and foreign affairs 
than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after the initiation of a 
use of force abroad. 
H6a: Members of Congress belonging to the president’s party will 
demonstrate greater support for the president’s policy positions on key 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Wildavsky (1966) and Fleisher and Bond (1988) 
28 Policy Area for key roll call vote has been coded by Stoll (2006) as being Domestic, Political, Foreign, 
or Military.  
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roll call votes involving the military and foreign affairs than other policy 
areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after the initiation of a uses of force 
abroad.   
H6b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the 
president will demonstrate greater support for the president’s policy 
positions on key roll call votes involving the military and foreign affairs 
than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after uses of force 




The principle focus of this thesis is the examination of how presidential decisions 
to initiate violent interstate conflicts (i.e. the initiation of a use of force abroad) impact 
members’ of Congress voting behavior.  Specifically, I intend to use the theory offered in 
the previous section to develop a congressional behavior model that allows me to test 
my derived hypotheses.  Evidence showing that presidents receive higher levels of 
presidential support and success from members of Congress after the initiation of a use 
of force abroad represents a powerful incentive for struggling presidents to choose 
diversionary behavior.  Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I define presidential 
support in Congress to be the percentage of members in each chamber of Congress 
that defer to the president’s position on a key roll call vote.  Likewise, I define 
presidential success to be the probability that a president’s policy position is followed by 
each Chamber. 
4.1 Measuring the Dependent Variables 
From the above definitions of congressional support and success, I am able to 
construct multiple dependent variables that are uniquely able to test the predictions laid 
out by my theory.  The principle data for measuring congressional support and success 
comes from Stoll’s (2006) congressional vote data set.  In this data set, Stoll codes 
every key roll call vote identified by Congressional Quarterly editors29 in both the House 
                                                 
29 Congressional Quarterly editors select key votes concerning major issues for each year.   
“An issue is judged to be a key vote by the extent to which it represents: 
• a matter of major controversy 
• a matter of presidential or political power 
• a matter of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans” (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2001 pp. C-3).  
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and Senate for the years 1945-1993.30  I have chosen to use Stoll’s congressional data 
for two distinct reasons.  First, during times of political and economic trouble, presidents 
will need to be able to pass significant legislation in order to address domestic 
problems.  Since key votes are designated based on matters of “presidential power” and 
their possible “impact” on the public (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001 pp. C-3), 
Stoll’s data allows me to determine whether congressional rallies serve as a possible 
incentive for presidents to use diversionary behavior in order to obtain greater support 
on salient votes.  It also allows me to analyze whether uses of force abroad affect 
members’ voting behavior on issues that have been deemed important.  Previous 
scholarship posits that members’ voting decisions are primarily determined by electoral 
and partisan forces.31  But, Stoll’s data provides a means of determining whether other 
external forces -like strategically minded presidents- are able to influence members’ 
behavior more than previously thought.     
To generate my dependent variables to measure presidential support in 
Congress, my unit of analysis is every key roll call vote where the president has taken a 
position from 1948-1993.  For each individual vote, I calculate a presidential support 
score that represents the percentage of the entire chamber that deferred to the 
president’s position.  I do this by summing the total number of members that deferred to 
the president’s position ( ciS , ) for each individual key roll call vote (subscript i) from the 
chamber as a whole (subscript c).  I then divide that sum by the total number of 
members in the chamber that have taken a position, represented by ).~( ,, cici SS +   
                                                 
30 Due to missing data for the years 1945, 1946, and 1947, only key roll call votes during the years 1948-
1993 are analyzed.  
31 See, for example, Mayhew (1974) and Aldrich (1994).  
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Where (~ ciS , ) represents the total number of members that did not defer to the 
president’s position. 







This calculation generates a variable that varies continuously from a low of 0 to a max 
of 100 with a one unit increase representing a one percent increase in presidential 
support from the chamber.  This allows me to determine what factors, including the use 
of force abroad, influence the amount of support Congress extends to presidents on key 
roll call votes.   
Because some scholars (e.g. Morgan and Bickers 1992; Foster and Palmer 
2006) have argued that diversionary behavior is meant to bolster lagging support within 
the president’s own party, two additional dependent variables are created in order to 
analyze fluctuations in presidential support in the House and Senate across party 
identification.  Much like the first dependent variable, a presidential support score is 
calculated for each key roll call vote. However, instead of comparing the total sum of all 
members that support the president’s position against the chamber as a whole 
(subscript “c”), support scores are calculated to determine the percentage of members 
of the president’s party (subscript “p”) and the percentage of members belonging to the 
opposition party (subscript “o”) have deferred to the president’s position.   
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If congressional rallies do occur, these variables provide us with a greater knowledge of 
who lends greater support to presidents after uses of force.  It also allows us to 
determine whether uses of force abroad have a unifying or polarizing impact on 
members’ decision-making.   
 Higher levels of presidential support do not always translate into presidents 
getting their policy preferences through Congress.  Also, presidents do not need to 
receive higher levels of support to get their agendas realized.  They only need to 
procure enough member support to insure that their position will pass.  To test whether 
uses of force abroad lead to congressional rallies that increase the likelihood that 
presidents are able to get their policy preferences through Congress, I use the chamber 
as a whole support scores discussed above to create a dichotomous dependent 
variable measuring presidential success.  Presidential success is coded as (1) for each 
key roll call vote where the chamber as a whole demonstrates presidential support that 
exceeds 50% -a simple majority-, and coded as (0) otherwise.   Because rallies are 
thought to lead to greater feelings of unity, I create an additional dichotomous variable 
to test the likelihood that presidents are able to obtain bi-partisan support for their policy 
preferences.  Bi-partisan support is coded as a (1) for each key roll call vote where 
simple majorities -greater than 50%- are observed to support the president by both 
members of the president’s party and among members of the opposition party.  All 
observations that fail to meet this simple dual-majority threshold are coded as (0). 
Together, these new dichotomous variables are able to provide valuable information 
that is crucial to fully testing my theory.  While the three previous dependent variables 
help shed light on how much support presidents should expect, presidential success 
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and bi-partisan support allow us to assess how congressional responses to uses of 
force abroad impact the outcomes of key legislation.  Such information goes directly to 
determining whether presidents are able to use their positions as Commander in Chief 
to translate into personal political and domestic benefits.   
4.2 Measuring the Independent Variables 
The Use of Force Abroad 
 In order to accurately model the influences that aggressive foreign policies have 
on members of Congress, two specific factors must be accounted for: when has the US 
initiated uses of force abroad and what key roll call votes may be affected by them.  To 
measure these two factors I use all US initiated militarized interstate disputes (MID) 
where the US used force abroad32 from 1948 to 1993 as recorded in the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute data set (version 3.02).33  Because the principle aim of this thesis is 
to examine the domestic effects that occur after US initiated militarized actions, other 
widely used data sets that include observations on possible opportunities to use force 
would not be appropriate.  I generate my sample of US initiated uses of force by 
determining whether the US initiated the dispute (SideA), and whether the 
corresponding hostility level variable (HostLev) for the US scores a four and above on 
level of force used.34  This sample of US initiated uses of force will give me the temporal 
                                                 
32 Clear distinctions need to be made between all US uses of force and the specific selection of cases that 
is being used in this thesis.  Only US uses of force during the years 1948 to 1993 where the US has been 
coded as the dyadic initiator of the conflict are being employed.  All remaining US uses of force have 
been excluded.  This selection procedure provides me the opportunity to test how members of Congress 
respond when it is the US that is the aggressor abroad, rather than analyzing how members respond to 
the use of force abroad in general.   
33 MID data set can be obtained from http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.  Coding and data collection procedures are 
discussed in Gochman and Maoz (1984) and Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996). 
34 From 1948 to 1993, the US has initiated 77 MID’s.  Of those MID's, the US used force, designated as a 
4 and above on the disputes HostLev variable, 32 separate times.  These 32 MID’s represent my sample 
of US initiated uses of force abroad.     
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reference points needed to account for any impact that initiated uses of force may have 
on congressional support and presidential success over time through my dependent 
variables.  Three temporal variables are created representing key roll call votes that 
take place within 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 days after the initiation of a use of force 
abroad.35  Each temporal dummy variable is coded as (1) if an initiated use of force took 
place within a designated number of days before a key roll call vote, and (0) 
otherwise.36  Together, these temporal dummy variables are used to gauge the impacts 
of a recently initiated use(s) of force on the level of legislative support and legislative 
success Congress affords presidents.   
Other Independent Variables 
 In order to construct a model of congressional voting behavior, specific domestic 
factors found within the literature to influence members’ voting decisions must also be 
considered. Research into public opinion has shown that foreign policy matters greatly 
influence how the public supports the president, but the most influential factor remains 
to be the public’s perceived health of the economy.37  Because strong links have been 
found between members’ voting behavior and their constituents’ opinions (Mayhew 
1974; Feno 1978), and presidential approval has been found to affect presidents’ 
abilities to promote their policy positions in Congress (Neustadt 1960, Rivers and Rose, 
1985, and Edwards 1989), variables controlling for monthly unemployment38, inflation39, 
                                                 
35 For a similar use of temporal dummy variables, consult Stoll (1987).   
36  Summarizing my temporal dummy variables, 30 key roll call votes in the House and 22 votes in the 
Senate have been coded as occurring within 30 days of an initiated use of force, 16 votes in the House 
and 22 votes in the Senate have been coded as occurring within 31-60 days of an initiated use of force, 
and 23 votes in the House and 32 votes in the Senate have been coded as occurring within 61-90 days of 
an initiated use of force.       
37 See, for example, Nincic and Hinckley (1991). 
38 Data on monthly unemployment levels come from the Department of Labour Statistics webpage: 
http://stats.bls.gov/top20.htm.   
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and presidential approval40 are included in the model.  All three variables have been 
lagged by one month in order to insure that they impact the dependent variable instead 
of the other way around.    
Additional evidence has also been found linking presidential success in Congress 
to the partisan composition of both chambers (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). 
We should expect that presidents who face Congresses made-up of more members of 
their party to receive greater levels of support, on average, than that of presidents 
having to work with fewer co-partisan members.  Therefore, I include a variable 
accounting for the total number of members of the president’s party in each chamber to 
control for both members’ and presidents’ partisan identifications.41  Higher numbers of 
co-partisan members of Congress are expected to be associated with higher levels of 
overall presidential support and legislative success.42   
Beyond party identification, members also rely on their own ideological 
predispositions to determine how they will position themselves on certain votes.  For 
this reason, different Congresses possessing similar partisan make-ups can display 
considerably different voting records in comparison depending on the ideological 
leanings of their members.  Because liberal ideology is often associated with expanding 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 CPI and inflation data can be downloaded from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis webpage: http://www.bea.doc.gove/.    
40 Monthly presidential approval data can be obtained from the Gallup organization website: 
http://www.gallup.com.   
41 Annual data on the percentage of members  of the president’s party in each chamber comes from Eric 
Reinhardt’s United States Congressional Party Discipline (USAPDISC) data set, which can be found on 
his website at: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/data/index.html 
42 Evidence from the Congressional literature (see Binder 1999; Krause 2000) would also have us 
suspect that the presence of divided government would also impact the amount of support and success 
presidents’ should expect from Congress.  To account for the effects of partisan incongruence between 
the president and Congress, I created a dummy variable coded as (1) for each year that divided 
government is observed, (0) otherwise.  Tests for multicollinearity find that the presence of divided 
government is highly correlated with that of the percent of the president’s party in congress variables, 
p=.7.  Use of the divided government dummy variable is found to yield similar results as my baseline 
model specification that includes the percent of the president’s party in congress variable.   
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the role of government to meet constituent interests, higher measures of liberalism are 
expected to lead to a more diverse set of policy preferences among members of 
Congress.  The presence of a wider diversity of policy preferences are predicted to 
makes it much harder for coalitions of support for the president to be formed.  I control 
for variations in membership ideological composition by including a composite liberalism 
score generated by Americans for Democratic Actions (ADA) measuring annual 
ideology, specifically liberalism, within Congress.  These scores have been adjusted for 
inflation by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) to better facilitate comparisons across 
time and chamber.43   
  An additional consideration must be made for the theoretical significance behind 
the “timing” of votes and presidential influence.  In some ways, greater experience does 
more to hinder presidents’ abilities to influence members of Congress than help.  The 
longer presidents are in office the more negative information the public and members of 
Congress are able to collect in order to form their assessments of presidential 
performance.  Such assessments help members determine whether to defer to 
presidents’ policy positions or not.  For this reason, Congressional scholars (e.g. 
Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998) predict that presidential success, on average, to 
steadily decline for each year of an administration’s tenure.  I control for such patterns 
of congressional support by including a variable that counts the number of years in 
office, at that time, for each president.  Presidents have been found to receive short 
drops in congressional support during election years.  Much of this work argues that 
strategically minded members propose legalization that will attract favor from their base 
                                                 
43 Inflation adjusted ADA scores can be obtained by contacting the authors, Groseclose, Levitt, and 
Snyder (1999).   
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constituents, there-by undermining more nationalist policies proposed by presidents.  
Members also have an incentive to show greater independence come election times in 
order to avoid any possible negative coat-tail effects that may occur (Brady, Canes-
Wrone, and Cogan 2000; Brady et. al. 1996).  To account for these expected drops in 
support, I include a dummy variable coded as (1) for every year that a congressional 
election is held, (0) otherwise. 
My final control variable is used to account for possible variations in presidential 
powers and influence across different policy areas.  As pointed out in the previous 
section, congressional scholars have long held that presidential powers provide them 
with greater influence on matters concerning US foreign policy and defense.44  To 
control for this additional influence, I include a dummy variable coded as (1) for all key 
roll call votes concerning foreign and defense issues, while votes on domestic and 
political issues are coded as (0).  Beyond performing as a simple control in the base 
models, this variable plays a critical role in testing hypotheses 9-10 in later, expanded, 
models.  There, I interact my foreign/defense dummy variable with my three use of force 
variables. Through this procedure, I am able to hash out possible differences in 
membership voting behavior for foreign and defense votes occurring directly after uses 
of force abroad vs. votes concerning domestic and political issues occurring directly 
after uses of force abroad. 
4.3 Methods Discussion 
To fully test the hypotheses derived above, I employ multiple statistical 
techniques in three distinct stages of analysis.  In the first and most basic stage, I 
analyze the data’s summary statistics in order to develop a fuller understanding of 
                                                 
44 For examples, see, Wildavsky (1966) and Fleisher and Bond (1988). 
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member decision-making in regards to presidential support and success at the 
aggregate level.  Specific points of interest include the mean levels of support and 
probabilities of success presidents receive from members of Congress.  I then use 
simple cross-tabs analysis to examine how presidential support is distributed across 
both chambers.  In effect, the goal of this stage of analysis is to use summaries of the 
dependent variables to observe possible patterns and trends that are already apparent 
within the data.  With such knowledge, we are then better able to move on to stages two 
and three where more sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques are utilized. 
 The next two stages of analyses use the dependent variables outlined above and 
presented in Table 1.1 to individually examine how uses of force affect the amount of 
legislative support and success presidents receive from Congress, as per my derived 
hypotheses.  To accomplish this task, specific multivariate statistical techniques are 
used in accordance with the requirements for each dependent variable.  Stage two 
primarily examines what factors determine the amount of member support presidents 
should, on average, receive for their policy positions.  From my discussion above, the 
generation process for the three dependent variables measuring presidential support 
(support from the chamber as a whole, president’s party, and opposition party) create 
variables that vary continuously from 0 to 100.  The continuous nature of the dependent 
variables leaves open the possibility of using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.  Even though all three variables are limited from 0 to 100, OLS regression is 
still an appropriate method for obtaining parameter estimates if each model’s residuals 
are normally distributed (Gujerati 2004 pp. 337-339).  However, after multiple tests, I 
have determined that my data violates OLS regression’s key assumption of normality, 
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making it an inappropriate estimation technique.45  In the end, I have chosen to use 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) as my main method of analysis.  Presidential 
support is tested with Stata 9.0 statistical software package using a general linear 
model for a gamma distributed dependent variable and an identity link.  Such an 
estimation technique automatically provides me with the marginal effects of my MLE 
models, allowing me to interpret how a one unit change in my independent variables 
produces a β unit change in the dependent variable (StataCorp 2005).   
 For the final stage of analysis, I focus on how different factors, specifically uses 
of force abroad, impact presidential success in Congress.  To test for my hypothesized 
relationships, I use the two remaining dependent variables that account for whether or 
not presidents obtain a simple majority as well as bipartisan support for their positions in 
Congress.  The dichotomous nature of these dependent variables causes simple OLS 
regression and other estimation techniques that model continuous variables to be 
inappropriate.  In order to best model the expected outcomes, while utilizing widely 
known statistical techniques46, I run MLE probit, models to analyze my data.  The fairly 
large N samples being used for both the House and Senate chambers (358 and 330 
observations respectively), insures that MLE’s asymptotic properties will obtain 
unbiased and efficient parameter estimates for my model (Greene 2000 pp.126-127).  
Probit models also allow me to easily calculate the marginal effects associated with 
each independent variable, which provides the impact that my exogenous variables 
                                                 
45To test whether each of the three support variable’s residuals are distributed normally, all three 
variables were ran using OLS regression with the baseline model specification outlined below.  The 
residuals for all twelve models –six for the House and six for the Senate- were then tested using Shapiro-
Wilk W tests for normally distributed data (StataCorp 2005).  In all twelve cases I was easily able to reject 
the null that the model’s residuals are normally distributed.   Results for all twelve normality tests can be 
found in Table 6, Appendix B.   
46 See, for example, Aldrich and Nelson (1984), Stoll (1987), Meernik (1993), and Meernik and Oldmixon 
(2004).  
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have on the probability that presidents’ positions are followed while holding all else 
constant at their mean (StataCorp 2005). 
 For both stages 2 ad 3, the two statistical methods outlined above are employed 




























Where ( xi,Υ ) represents the impact specific factors have on presidential support as well 
as the probability of presidential success from members of Congress, depending on 
which dependent variable is specified.  The subscript (i) represents the individual vote 
being observed, (x) represents what unit of analysis is being examined, (t-1) signifies a 
one month lag from the observed key roll call vote, and ( txi ,,ε ) represents a non-
normally distributed error term.47  Table 1.2 reviews the predicted relationships for all 
variables in the baseline specification models.  All MLE models are reported using 
robust standard errors clustered by year to correct for any problems that may occur due 
to unspecified heteroskedasticity (StataCorp 2005).  The results and analysis of these 
models will be discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
47 Tests for multicollinearity among the independent variables specified for both of my House and Senate 
base line models have been conducted using correlation matrixes.  In both data sets, multicollinearity was 
found not to be present.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 In the following chapter I report and analyze the results for the empirical models 
specified in the previous chapter.  Overall, my tests of whether presidential decisions to 
initiate uses of force abroad lead to higher levels of legislative support and success in 
Congress yield mix findings.  In fact, despite my main explanatory variables yielding 
highly significant and substantively large parameter estimates, my findings suggest that 
presidential decisions to initiate a use of force abroad leads to sharp decreases in 
legislative support, the exact opposite relationships hypothesized by my theory.   
Evidence of congressional rally effects are found among members of the president’s 
party and when presidents are able to tie key roll call vote to matters of US foreign 
policy and national defense.  But, in both cases, the positive impacts found may play 
only a limited role in alleviating presidents of the domestic woes plaguing their 
administrations. Initiated violent conflicts abroad are found to have little or no impact on 
overall presidential success and bi-partisan support in Congress.  Whatever substantive 
impacts that they may have on congressional support only appear when controls for 
policy area are in place.  Even then, uses of force are still, for the most part, an 
insignificant factor on legislative outcomes.  Instead, for both legislative support and 
success, the primary force influencing membership decision-making is each member’s 
partisan affiliations.  Administrations serving during times with higher numbers of co-
partisans in Congress should, on average, receive higher levels of legislative support 
and success than otherwise, re-affirming past findings from the congressional literature 
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(e.g. Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995; see also Bond and Fleisher 1990; 
Edwards 1989). 
5.1 Summary Statistics and Apparent Trends in the Data 
 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary statistics for the dependent variables 
specified above to examine presidential support and success in Congress for both the 
House and Senate.  Statistics are presented divided by chamber for a more in-depth 
look at how each institution responds to presidential preferences.  From Table 2.1, 
presidents, on average, are expected to receive a thin majority of support for their 
legislative preferences in both chambers.  Such findings are echoed in Table 2.2 where 
presidents are found to be successful at getting their policy preferences through both 
the House and Senate 59.18 and 65.77 percent of the time respectively.  Differences in 
mean partisan support appear to follow what would be expected from the Congress 
literature (see, e.g. Aldrich 1994; Bond and Fleisher 1990) with much higher levels of 
support, on average, coming from co-partisan members versus those affiliated with the 
opposition party.   
 Presidents are also, on average, expected to receive higher levels of presidential 
support and success from members of the Senate across all four dependent variables.  
One interesting finding is that the mean value for co-partisan legislative support in the 
House is actually smaller than the mean legislative support presidents receive from the 
chamber as a whole; representing 51.31 and 51.38 percent membership support 
respectively.  At first glance, it would appear that partisan forces may be stronger for 
members in the Senate than in the House.  However, these apparent differences in 
presidential support and probabilities of presidential success may be due to institutional 
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variations found across both chambers.  Frequent elections cause members of the 
House to be more reactionary to changes in public opinion and short-term political 
issues, while longer terms of office afford members of the Senate with more electoral 
insulation to act freely (see also Meernik 1993; Meernik and Oldmixon 2004).  While 
these institutional differences may shape how members respond to uses of force, the 
extent to which such factor influence membership decision-making will be more fully 
addressed in the latter two stages of analysis.    
 Since all four dependent variables are generated based on the amount of 
presidential support extended by members of Congress, it is important to know whether 
the observed levels of support for both samples are skewed one way or another.   Table 
3 reports how presidential support is distributed in the House and Senate across the 
total range of variation in 20 percent increments.   Looking at the chamber as a whole 
for both the House and Senate, we see that, by far, the largest proportion of votes occur 
in the middle -41-60%- support bracket, while smaller proportions of votes fall in the 
outer brackets.  The distribution of presidential support for both dependent variables 
measuring partisan decision-making conform to expectations with the highest 
percentage of votes falling in the upper two distribution brackets for members of the 
president’s party and the exact opposite for members belonging to the opposition party.  
These finding provide me with confidence that, despite both samples being made-up of 
only key roll call votes, membership decision-making follow predictable patterns of 
presidential support.   
5.2 Results and Analysis for Presidential Support 
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 In this section I report the results and analysis of multivariate statistical tests 
specified to examine how the initiation of violent conflicts abroad affect members’ 
decision-making in regards to supporting the president’s policy positions in Congress.  
To account for presidential support, I use multiple MLE models specified to analyze 
gamma distributed dependent variables.  These models examine all key roll call votes 
for both the House and Senate for the years 1948 to 1993.  Because the hypotheses 
derived from my theory are directional, predicting rallies of support from members 
directly after uses of force abroad, one-tail tests for statistical significance are reported 
in all tables.  Results for all six models ran with my baseline specification examining 
presidential support are reported in the Table 4.1. 
Across all six models, the primary variables of interest have been placed at the 
very bottom of each column.  Through the three different use of force dummy variables I 
am able to test whether the presidential decision to initiate a violent conflict abroad 
positively impacts the amount of presidential support they receive for their policy 
preferences in Congress.  Looking at both models examining the chamber as a whole 
(Models 1 and 4), the results indicate that initiating uses of force abroad do not lead to 
rallies of support for the president in Congress.  In fact, the relationship that is reported 
expresses the exact opposite of what is predicted.  Presidents, on average, should 
expect that members will extend less support for their policy preferences by 10.7 
percent 31-60 days post-use of force in the House and 6.5 percent 1-30 days post-use 
of force in the Senate.  Such evidence easily allows me to not reject the nulls for 
Hypothesis 1a and, subsequently, Hypothesis 2a.  It also lends further credence to 
Howell and Pevehouse’s (2005) argument that presidents should not exercise their 
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powers to initiate a use force abroad lightly, or else suffer the consequences of their 
decisions wrought by a hostile Congress.  With these findings, it is not too hard to 
imagine a president flexing the US’s military muscles abroad only to have his domestic 
influence severely weakened by disgruntled members at home.  Substantively and 
statistically significant drops in presidential support of over 10 and 6 percent in the 
House and Senate could easily mean the difference in the successful or unsuccessful 
passage of important legislation.  It also signifies that, for presidents that are already 
facing domestic problems, the decision to use of force abroad may make their positions 
even more vulnerable in the long-run.   
 Partisan affiliation appears to play a significant role in shaping how members 
respond to the initiation of violent conflicts abroad.  From the remaining four models 
presented in Table 4.1 (Models 2, 3, 5, and 6), a clear split can be seen in how 
members support presidential preferences in the wake of initiated uses of force.  
Members belonging to the president’s party display little to no response across 
chambers.  The results show that members of the House that belong to the president’s 
party are quick to rally to the president’s side by extending greater amounts of support 
by 8 percent towards his policy preferences in the first 30 days after the initiation of a 
use of force.  This substantive increase in support comes out to be statistically 
significant at below the .05 level.  Co-partisan members within the Senate also show 
signs of rallies of presidential support post initiation of force.  However, none of the 
coefficients on the use of force variables come close to meeting even the most lax 
thresholds for statistical significance.  Together, these findings allow me to reject the 
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null for Hypothesis 3a for members of the House, while, simultaneously, failing to reject 
the null for Hypothesis 3a for members of the Senate.    
On the other side of the isle, members belonging to the opposition party appear 
to not shy away from showing their dissatisfaction when presidents decide to initiate a 
violent conflict abroad.  From Models 3 and 6, the results show that opposition members 
extend much less support to presidential preferences -by a sizeable 17 percent in the 
House and 11 percent in the Senate- 1-30 days and 31-60 days after the initiation of 
uses of force abroad, respectively.  In both cases, the coefficients for these results beat 
the highest thresholds of statistical significance (p<.01).  The overall impact of these 
findings causes me to easily fail to reject the nulls for Hypotheses 3b and 4b.  It also 
provides us with a clearer understanding of why negative post-force relationships are 
found above for both chambers as a whole models (Models 1 and 4).  It is apparent that 
the overwhelming drops in support presidents’ face from members of the opposition are 
more than enough to overshadow any –miniscule in comparison- positive rallies of 
support that may occur from members of their own party.   
 Beyond simply looking at how members respond to uses of force abroad, 
important differences in membership decision-making appear to surface across 
chambers concerning when members respond.  For the House and Senate, two out of 
three models examining each chamber (Models 1 & 3 and 4 & 6) show statistically 
significant drops in support after initiated uses of force abroad.  In both cases, negative 
significant findings in the chamber as a whole (Models 1 and 4) can be seen as a 
reflection of the massive drops in presidential support by members of the opposition 
party (Models 3 and 6) during the same time periods.  The similar relationships 
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expressed by both chambers can be attributed to partisan forces acting on members’ 
decision-making.  However, differences in membership timing can be attributed to 
institutional differences affecting members’ responses differently.  As expressed above, 
members of the House are thought to be more reactionary to changes in public opinion 
and interests due to more prevalent electoral forces.  The 30 day hesitation displayed 
by the House opposition party can be seen as members testing the water of their 
constituent opinions before coming out with their own response.  Failing to account for 
their constituents’ reactions could lead to political problems that House members cannot 
afford.  On the other hand, members of the Senate, with their longer terms of office and 
greater freedom to independently act, are quick to distance themselves from the 
president’s policy preferences.  Ironically, members of the House opposition party 
compensated for their slow response by generating much larger drops in presidential 
support than their co-partisan members in the Senate.  The only statistically significant 
increases in presidential support observed across all six models comes from members 
of the president’s party in the House within the first 30 days after the initiation of a use 
of force abroad.  This, by far, is the only relationship found that could be considered a 
congressional rally; explaining why members of the president’s party immediately 
respond with greater support for presidential preferences.  All together, the partisan and 
institutional influences discussed above cause me to not reject the nulls for Hypotheses 
H2b and H4b, while, simultaneously, allowing me to successfully reject the null for H4a.  
After initial rallies, presidential support from members of the president’s party quickly 
dissipates back to normal levels.   
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 Beyond international affairs, the partisan make-up of each chamber is found to 
be the most substantive and statistically significant factor influencing members’ 
decisions to support the president’s policy preferences across all six models.  The 
relationships expressed, with one clear exception (Model 6), follow closely with what 
had been expected; reaffirming previous findings concerning partisan affiliation in the 
Congress literature (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989: see also Fiorina 1977; 
Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995).  Presidents, on average, should expect to receive 
increases in presidential support by 10.5 percent in the House and almost 40 percent in 
the Senate with every 1 percent increase in the president’s party in chamber.  Both of 
these results are statistically significant; surpassing, at least, the .05 threshold for 
directional one-tailed tests.  Presidents should receive their largest increases in support 
–around 52 percent in both Model 2 and 4- from members of their own party with 
increases in their membership in both chambers.  As predicted, increases of the 
President’s party in House by 1 percent tend to cause members of the opposition party 
to decrease their support for the president by over 25 percent.  Members of the 
opposition party in the Senate stand as the lone exception to the divisive partisan trend 
divisiveness found in other five models.  The empirical evidence shows that these 
members extend significantly higher levels of presidential support –over 27 percent- as 
more members of the president’s party gain seats in the chamber.  Once again, these 
differences in behavior may be due to greater institutional freedoms felt by Senators; 
allowing them more opportunities to vote across party lines and ignore partisan rivalries.   
 The state of the economy plays a significant influence on whether members will 
support the president’s policy preferences.  Results show that unit increases in the rates 
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of unemployment and inflation are found to decrease presidential support in the House’s 
chamber as a whole (Model 1) at under the .05 level of significance.  These findings are 
matched with mixed and insignificant parameter estimates for the chamber as a whole 
in the Senate (Model 4).  Poor economic performance had been predicted to lower 
presidential support among members of the opposition party, just as unit increases of 
unemployment lead to 2.9 percent decreases in support in the Senate.  But, 
surprisingly, members of the opposition are found to increase their support in both the 
House by .86 percent and Senate by .87 percent with unit increases in inflation.  These 
counter intuitive findings may be due to the non-uniform impact of high inflation on the 
population (see. Nincic 1997), or due to its root causes –unconstrained growth of the 
economy- actually benefiting constituents and, there by, benefiting members’ 
interests.48  Members of the president’s party are found to have higher levels of 
presidential support during times of high unemployment (3.5 percent in the Senate) and 
for high inflation (1.2 percent in the Senate).  Both of these findings reach statistical 
significance with each meeting, at least, the .05 threshold for one-tailed directional tests.  
In many ways, co-partisan members’ behavior is not all that surprising considering that 
their electoral/political fortunes are often tied directly to how the public perceives the 
president’s job performance (Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Campbell 1993; Jacobson 
1997).  During times of economic trouble, members of the president’s party may try to 
bolster sitting president’s domestic positions before deciding to withdraw their support.      
                                                 
48 Hibbs (1977; 1987) finds that Democratic presidents are more likely to pursue Macroeconomic policies 
aimed at maintaining low levels of unemployment that, inadvertently, lead to higher levels of inflation.  
Such policies would be endorsed by fellow Democrats in Congress whose constituents benefit more from 
stable employment versus low inflation.     
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 The remaining variables in my baseline specification tend to perform as 
predicted, with only a few minor exceptions.  Unit increases in presidential popularity 
are found to lead to no substantive impact on presidential support across all six models.  
Interestingly, parameter estimates for all three models examining the House (Models 1-
3) present evidence of a negative relationship between popularity and support, but 
coefficients for presidential popularity across all models fail to be statistically significant.  
The ideological make-up of the chamber comes out to be a significant influence on 
membership voting behavior in three out of the four models (Models 2, 3, and 5) 
specified to examine the effects of partisanship.  In all three cases, the variables 
performed as expected with increases in liberalism leading to drops of 1.9, .97, and .74 
percent in presidential support, respectively.  Tenure in the White House, or 
administration year, is found to lead to substantive and statistically significant decreases 
in presidential support in the House’s chamber as a whole and among members of the 
opposition party in the Senate.  These decreases are enough that two term lame-duck 
presidents can expect, on average, almost 10 percent less support in the House and 
almost 24 percent less support among Senate opposition members going into their last 
year of office.  Whether or not it is an election year for members of Congress yields 
mixed relationships across both chambers, and fails to reach any level of statistical 
significance.  Finally, whether or not a key roll call vote concerns US foreign policy or 
defense is found to only significantly matter to members of the president’s party in the 
Senate (Model 5).  The presence of such a vote, rather surprisingly, leads to a 
substantive 7 percent drop in presidential support.      
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 In Table 4.2, I present results for an expanded version of the baseline model 
specification discussed above in order to test whether initiated violent conflicts have 
varying impacts on members’ voting behavior across different policy areas.  I test for 
variations in presidential support by adding several interaction terms.  Three interaction 
terms have been derived by multiplying my foreign/defense policy dummy variable with 
each of my three use of force dummy variables.  The product of each interaction 
represents a dummy variable that signifies whether or not a specific key roll call vote 
taking place within 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 days of an initiated use of force concerns 
matters of US foreign policy or national defense.  Otherwise, the key roll call vote 
concern matters of domestic or political policy.  Together, along with the original Use of 
Force variables, these new interactions terms are specified to test Hypotheses 4a, 5a, 
and 5b.  The creation of my interaction terms using the foreign/defense policy dummy 
variable also creates tacit interactions between my uses of force variables that have yet 
to be accounted for.  Failure to include variables to control for these tacit interactions 
automatically assumes the impact of such relationships as 0 (Braumoeller 2004).  Tests 
for the presence of tacit interactions have found that no additional variables are needed 
within the models examining the House (Models 7-9), while two additional variables 
accounting for interactions between votes that occur 1-30 and 31-60 days after as well 
as 31-60 and 61-90 days after uses of force are required within models examining the 
Senate ( Models 10-12). 
 Focusing on the key variables of interest, all of the reported relationships 
addressed above –except one- remain statistically significant and pointing in the same 
direction even with the inclusion of multiple interaction terms. Interestingly, the only 
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significant relationship that fails to resurface from Table 4.1, positive increases in 
support from members of the president’s party within 30 days of initiating a use of force, 
represents the only evidence suggesting that congressional rallies of support do occur.   
Another departure from previous findings is that members of the opposition party are 
now seen to be the only partisan group significantly responding to presidents’ decisions 
to initiate a use force abroad.  Their reactions, just as in the previous six models, appear 
to significantly decrease the amount of support that presidents should expect from both 
chambers as a whole (Model 7 and 10).  Lack of significant findings for members of the 
president’s party (Models 8 and 11) may be due to the already high levels of support 
normally shown, making it much more difficult for surges of presidential support to be 
detected.  Lastly, members of the Senate’s opposition party are predicted to increase 
their support by 10.25 percent for the president’s policy preferences concerning 
domestic and political policies 31-60 days after the initiation of a use of force, holding all 
else constant.  However, problems estimating some parameter estimates along with 
their standard errors within Model 12 cause any significant findings presented to be 
viewed as suspect.  Therefore, in the remaining analysis, results from Model 12 will only 
be discussed in general terms in order to minimize errors due to false inferences.   
 The inclusion of the interaction terms within the baseline specification provide us 
with some important information regarding membership decision-making and 
presidential support.  Significant negative relationships associated with initiating a 
violent conflict abroad provide evidence that members of the opposition party (Models 9 
and 12) –and subsequently the chamber as a whole (Models 7 and 10)- extend much 
less support to presidential preferences for votes specifically concerning matters of 
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domestic and political policy.  It is also important to note that the substantive impacts of 
all of the negative coefficients increase in size when only domestic and political policy 
interests are being considered.  From these findings, we can surmise that the smaller 
negative findings of previous use of force variables could be due –in part- to the 
inclusion of foreign/defense votes that dilute their overall impacts.  Evidence from the 
interaction term used to account for tacit interactions between the use of force 31-60 
and 61-90 variables finds that repeated periods of conflict (where presidents initiate 
interstate disputes where force is used two months in a row) bring decreases in 
presidential support among members of the opposition party and, subsequently, the 
chamber as a whole by as much as 23 percent and 16 percent, respectively.  Overall, 
for domestically troubled presidents, the negative congressional relationships 
associated with acts of aggression abroad only make it harder for them to promote and 
implement domestic policies that can address the country’s problems.  Thus, presidents 
will only find their ability to act in the domestic arena even more constrained after 
initiating a diversionary military action abroad. 
 Members’ decision-making in regards to key roll call votes concerning matters of 
foreign policy and national defense post-initiation of a use of force tells a decidedly 
different story.  For the most part, the (use of force x foreign/domestic) interaction terms 
perform exactly as predicted above.  Once again, violent interstate conflicts appear to 
have their most significant effects on the voting behavior of members of the opposition 
party in both chambers.  Presidents, on average, should expect to receive increases of 
support from opposition members in both the House (18.66 percent) and Senate (11.11 
percent) on foreign/national defense key roll call votes 1-30 days after initiating a use of 
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force abroad.  In the Senate, these opposition rallies are enough to translate into 
increases in presidential support from the chamber as a whole by 12.76 percent during 
the same period.  Coefficients for all three relationships are found to be statistically 
significant at the .05 level for one-tailed directional tests.  The findings also show that 
opposition members in the House (Model 9) dramatically increase their support by 
36.99 percent for the president’s policy preferences on key foreign/defense roll call 
votes 31-60 days after uses of force.   This highly substantive relationship is also 
statistically significant at the highest level (.01) for one-tailed tests.  Finally, consistent 
positive and statistically significant increases in presidential support are reported for the 
House’s chamber as a whole (12.72 percent), House members of the opposition party 
(22.46 percent), the Senate’s Chamber as a Whole (14.15 percent), the President’s 
party in the Senate (22.51 percent), and the Senate’s opposition party (37.26 percent) 
on key foreign/defense roll call votes 61-90 days after the initiation of a use of force 
abroad.  The contrasting relationships between foreign/defense votes versus those 
concerning domestic/political policies clearly lends further evidence to Wildavasky’s 
(1966; see also Bond and Fleisher 1988) two presidencies thesis of asymmetrical 
presidential influence in the legislative process.  However, the full extent of this 
additional power has yet to be determined.   
 To fully understand how important variations in policy area play in members’ 
decision-making we must examine the marginal effects from both the upper and lower 
order interaction terms.  Table 4.3 presents the predicted results for all interaction terms 
in Models 7-12.  For each thirty day conflict initiation period being observed, three rows 
are assigned to list the predicted impacts of key roll call votes involving 
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domestic/political policies (the coefficient on the use of force variables), the additional 
predicted impacts of key roll call votes that involve foreign/defense policy matters (the 
coefficient of corresponding interaction variables), and the overall net impacts of key 
foreign/defense roll call votes on presidential support.  The label “No Effect” displayed 
for all use of force and interaction variables that fail to meet even the most lax level of 
statistical significance. 
  The results offer evidence that members, especially of the opposition party, 
provide rallies of presidential support on key foreign/defense roll call votes in the wake 
of an initiated violent conflict abroad.  In every instance, save one, where statistically 
significant relationships are reported for the interaction terms, the recorded total net 
impacts on member decision-making (reported in bold) produce double-digit increases 
in presidential support.  It is clear that the substantively large coefficients reported for 
the interaction terms above more than compensate for the very large decreases in 
presidential support associated with votes concerning domestic/political issues.  The 
lone exception to these findings comes from Model 12 where initiated uses of force 
suspiciously produce a 1.6 percent decrease in presidential support among Senate 
opposition members.  But, even if this net impact is true, the coefficient on the 
corresponding interaction is still large enough to make it a minor loss for the president.  
All together, these findings provide me with more than enough evidence to reject the 
nulls for Hypotheses 4a, 5a, and 5b.  Members of Congress provide greater support to 
presidential preferences on key roll call votes concerning foreign/defense policies than 
key roll call votes on domestic/political polices after initiated uses of force abroad.   
5.3 Results and Analysis of Presidential Success 
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 In the previous section, tests are presented to examine how the initiation of 
violent conflicts abroad impact members’ decisions to support presidential policy 
preferences.  While membership support is critical for presidents to realize their 
legislative agendas, higher presidential support does not always directly translate into 
greater presidential success in getting policy preferences passed through Congress.  To 
account for this disparity, I ran multiple MLE probit models to examine how uses of force 
abroad impact the probability that presidents are able to obtain simple majorities of 
support for their policy preferences in Congress.   Just as in the previous models, all key 
roll call votes in the House and Senate are examined, and directional one-tail tests for 
statistical significance are reported.  Results for the baseline probit models examining 
the likelihood that presidents successfully obtain simple majorities for both chambers 
are reported in Tables 5.1.  In Tables 5.2, the baseline probit models are expanded in 
order to test how initiated uses of force abroad affect presidential success in Congress 
across different policy areas.   
 I begin this stage of analysis by reviewing the overall fit of the probit models 
being presented.  Looking first at each model’s Wald Χ² summary statistic, we can see 
that the greater majority of the models easily reject the null that all of the independent 
variables are, jointly, no different from zero.  Overall, the four models presented perform 
reasonably well at predicting presidential success. The baseline specification for the 
House (Model 13) correctly predicts 62.57 percent of key roll call vote outcomes with a 
7.59 percent proportionate reduction of error (PROE) over the modal category.49  In the 
Senate, the baseline specification correctly predicts 68.48 percent with a PROE of 7.13 
                                                 
49 Proportionate reduction of error is calculated as “(percent correctly predicted – modal percentage of 
dependent variable) / 100 – modal percentage of dependent variable” (Meernik and Oldmixon 2004 pp 
458). 
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percent.  Predictive accuracy is found to decrease with the inclusion of interaction terms 
testing for differences across policy areas.  Presidential success in the House is 
correctly predicted 61.73 percent of the time with a PROE of 4.92 percent.  Success in 
the Senate is correctly predicted 68.52 percent of the time leading to a 6.43 PROE.   
   Turning to the key variables, presidential decisions to initiate a violent conflict 
abroad are found not to significantly alter their chances of getting their legislative 
preferences through Congress.  For both the House and Senate, all three use of force 
variables –with one exception- are found to be insignificant predictors of presidential 
success.  In the one case where the initiation of a violent conflict does significantly 
matter (Model 14), presidents should expect an almost 24 percent decline in 
presidential success in the Senate 61-90 days after initiation.  From these findings, I am 
unable to reject the nulls for Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b.  Presidents are not more 
likely to be successful in Congress shortly after the initiation of uses of force abroad. 
 With the findings presented on presidential support in the previous section, the 
lack of significant relationships provides crucial insight into membership decision-
making.  Despite consistently negative significant relationships found for the chamber 
as a whole in both the House and Senate, we see that membership responses to US 
initiated uses of force, both negative and positive, rarely impact the final determination 
of key roll call votes.  Therefore, presidents who initiate violent conflicts abroad should, 
on average, expect to be as successful as they normally would on key roll call votes, 
excluding the sole exception discussed above.  To account for this disparity in my 
findings, I present two plausible explanations.  First, members, especially those 
belonging to the opposition party, may act strategically in their decisions on how they 
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respond to presidents acting aggressively abroad.  In that, those members deciding to 
show support or dissatisfaction with the president after initiating uses of force choose to 
do so, while, at the same time, making sure that their responses do not directly impact 
the key legislation’s final outcome.  Thus, members strategically insure that the policy 
preferences of their constituents continue to be represented, allowing them to better 
maintain their positions in office.  A competing explanation is that lack of findings may 
be due to aggregating all bill types together.  Differences found across policy areas in 
the previous section may, in effect, be canceling each other out.  Tests further 
examining this explanation will be conducted later in the analysis.     
 In general, the remaining control variables specified in all four models perform as 
would be expected, with only minor deviations.  One unit increases in the president’s 
party in chamber increases the probability that presidents are able to obtain simple 
majorities in the House and Senate by 74 percent and 136 percent, respectively.  Both 
of these relationships are statistically significant at, at least, the .05 level for directional 
one-tailed tests.  Economic factors are found to play a significant role in membership 
decision-making.  Unit increases of unemployment in the House lead to 2 percent 
decline in the probability that presidents receive a simple majority.  Other than that, 
increases in Inflation, surprisingly, leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the House.   
presidential popularity, for the first time, is found to be a significant predictor of 
membership behavior leading to unit increase of .7 percent in the probability of receiving 
a simple majority in the Senate.  More tenure is in office is found to lead to very small .1 
percent decreases in the probability that presidents’ are able to successfully obtain a 
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majority of support in Congress.  All remaining control variables specified in the four 
models perform as predicted, but fail to reach any level of statistical significance.  
 Tables 5.2 present an expanded version of my baseline specification in order to 
examine how the initiation of uses of force abroad impact presidential success across 
different policy areas.  From the start, we can see that accounting for foreign/defense 
policies versus domestic/political policies allows for more statistically significant 
relationships for my Uses of Force variables to be observed, confirming my second 
conclusion.  Presidential success in the House is found to decrease by 27 percent on 
domestic/political votes within 30 days of a use of force, while a similar decrease of 31 
percent taking place in the Senate 61-90 days of a use of force.  These relationships 
come out to be statistically significant using one-tailed directional tests.  Predicted 
relationships for the remaining Use of Force variables display a mix of positive and 
negative coefficients for presidential success.  But, these relationships fail to meet 
statistical significance.     
 Interaction terms in several of the models are found to be statistically significant 
as well.   Foreign/domestic votes taking place in the House 1-30 days and in the Senate 
61-90 days after the initiation of uses of force abroad are found to exhibit increases in 
presidential success.  Not surprisingly, just as in the previous section, the majority of 
these significant relationships correspond with significant negative findings for the use 
of force variables.  The coefficients for the other interaction terms fail to meet statistical 
significance at even the lowest levels for one-tailed tests.  Coefficients for the significant 
relationships appear to be large and pointing in the expected direction.  However, at this 
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point, the true substantive impacts of these relationships remain unclear until we assess 
each of their marginal effects.  
 Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects for the four models examining 
presidential success and bi-partisan support.  As can be seen from the net impacts 
displayed in bold, each of the three significant interaction terms produces a positive net 
impact on the likelihood on presidential success or bi-partisan support.  Key 
foreign/defense roll call votes are associated with almost a 4 percent increase in the 
probability of presidential success within 30 days of an initiation of violent conflict.  
Similarly, a 30.5 percent increase is associated with key foreign/defense roll call votes 
within the Senate 61-90 days after a use of force.   Both of these impacts, especially 
from the Senate, are substantively large changes in presidential success compared to 
chamber reactions to key roll call votes concerning matters of domestic/political issues.      
All together, more than enough evidence remains to support Hypothesis 5b.  
Presidents, on average, should expect to be more successful in getting their policy 
preferences through both chambers of Congress shortly after the initiation of a use of 




 In this thesis, multiple statistical techniques have been employed to test two 
distinct research questions; a) do members of Congress rally in support of presidential 
policy preferences shortly after the initiation of violent conflicts abroad and b) do 
presidents use their constitutionally assigned powers as Commander in Chief to obtain 
greater political success at home.  These questions are examined using all key roll call 
votes in both the House and Senate for the years 1948 to 1993.  I find that a majority of 
evidence presented in this study indicates that members of Congress, especially those 
of the opposition party, significantly change their voting behavior in response to 
presidents initiating violent conflicts abroad, but not in any way that is consistent with 
the most basic and underlying assumptions associated with the theory presented here 
or what we should expect from the diversionary narrative.  Such findings present clear 
negative implications for theorists that continue to present diversionary behavior as an 
explanation for presidential foreign policy decision-making.   
In the wake of initiating a violent conflict abroad, the evidence suggests that 
presidents, on average, should expect to receive sharp decreases in support of up to 11 
percent in the House and up to 6 percent in the Senate from the chamber as a whole.  
These findings are completely contradictory to the predicted relationships offered by my 
theory of congressional rally effects, outlined earlier in Chapter 3.  The evidence also 
suggests that strategically minded presidents, feeling constrained in their abilities to 
take action at the domestic level, would be unwise to act aggressively abroad, or else 
face even greater political difficulties in the aftermath.  It is at such times, after initial 
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rallies –if any- of approval have subsided, that presidents may find that the economic or 
political problems they attempted to forestall still remain, their constituents are even 
more miserable, and their abilities to act are even more hampered than before the 
diversionary action (Meernik and Waterman 1996).  Together, by considering post-force 
impacts on congressional behavior, my findings provide new evidence to a growing 
body of literature arguing that presidents cannot simply initiate violent conflicts abroad 
to obtain their own selfish benefits at home.   
 The results presented above also critically address one of the most explicit 
assumptions made within the diversionary literature regarding what incentives are 
driving presidential decision-making.  Although evidence of presidents receiving some 
form of boosts in public support after uses of force has been widely documented, 
exactly when such rally events occur and their overall impact on presidential approval is 
still widely debated.  This thesis adds to this debate by presenting new evidence that 
predictable rally effect do not occur within Congress.  In fact, presidential decisions to 
initiate violent conflicts abroad are found to cause sharp decreases of presidential 
support and success across both chambers of Congress, driven, primarily, by 
substantively large decreases in support among members of the opposition party.  
Across all twelve presidential support models, members of the opposition party routinely 
present the most powerful responses to presidential decisions to act aggressively 
abroad.  And, with only very specific exceptions, these negative responses are 
resolutely against the actions of the president.  Such reactions clearly fly in the face of 
the assumed unifying character of diversionary behavior.  Presidential decisions to 
initiate a violent conflict abroad are found to be a polarizing stimulus among members of 
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Congress.  Also, it is telling that the most visceral reactions repeatedly occur among 
members of the Opposition party.  Their strongly negative reactions make it evident that 
initiating a violent conflict abroad only exacerbates partisan division already present 
within Congress rather than rallying membership support.  Just as in the previous 
literature, the general results do not lend support or an explanation for any incentive for 
presidents to use diversionary behavior.   
 Beyond simple rally effects, my findings also shed further insights concerning 
one of the more popular variants of diversionary theory originally put forth by Morgan 
and Bicker (1993).  The results show very weak support for their theory that presidents 
are most likely to use force abroad in order to reverse dropping approval levels among 
members of their own party.  In general, the only evidence supporting the presence of a 
diversionary incentive from Congress comes from co-partisan members from the 
House.  When looking at general voting behavior, members of the president’s party in 
the House are seen to increase their support for the president’s policy preferences by 
as much as 8 percent in the first 30 days after initiating a use of force abroad.  The 
significance of this relationship disappears as more time passes, following the short-
term rallies of approval predicted by theory.  Despite these initial affirmative results, the 
same variables examining the impact of initiating a use of force produce insignificant 
parameter estimates in all of the other president’s party models.  This lack of findings is 
most interesting considering Edwards and Swenson’s (1997) past findings that 
individuals already predisposed to supporting the president are the most likely to rally in 
support after uses of force abroad.  One possibility is that the lack of significant findings 
from the other co-partisan models may be due to the already high amount of support 
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expressed by members of the president’s party.  However, the relatively mediocre mean 
levels of support in the low fifties in the House and low sixties in the Senate do offer a 
considerable amount of room for support to vary upwards.  Overall, the findings suggest 
that the centralized rallies of support observed among members of the president’s party 
in the House are clearly overshadowed by the aggregate losses in support from the 
chambers as a whole.  Presidents may be able to partially curtail dropping levels of 
support among members of their own party, but, in effect, they would be trading one 
domestic problem for another. 
 In addition to addressing theoretical issues involving diversionary theory, my 
findings also speak to how congressional behavior can indirectly influence presidential 
decision-making on matters concerning US foreign policy and national security.  Recent 
work by Clark (2000) and Howell and Pevehouse (2004) in the conflict literature have 
found evidence that the presence of divided government or a strong opposition within 
Congress indirectly reduces the likelihood that presidents decide to use force abroad.  
Much of this constraint on executive power has been attributed to the additional political 
and domestic costs that members of Congress can inflict on presidents after initiating a 
use of force.  However, despite much theorizing and work on Congress’s ability to 
influence the president, to my knowledge, this thesis is the first to present direct 
evidence of the negative impacts presidents should expect to receive from Congress 
and members of the opposition party after initiating a violent conflict abroad.  The sharp 
decreases in presidential support and success after the initiation of violent conflicts 
abroad lends strong support for previous findings of congressional constraint on US 
conflict behavior.  They also provide evidence of why future studies of presidential 
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decision-making in regards to the use of force should theoretically account for 
Congress’s response to pursuing confrontational foreign policies.   
 Another issue that my results address is how members of Congress respond 
differently across issue areas after the initiation of violent conflicts abroad.  Members of 
Congress are found to provide presidents with double digit increases in both 
presidential support and success on key roll call votes concerning matters of foreign 
policy and national defense in the wake of an initiated use of force.  However, these 
increases are often in sharp contrast to the significant double digit decreases in 
presidential support and success that occur at the same time on key roll call votes 
concerning domestic and political issues.  This evidence suggests that variations in 
members’ voting behavior across issue areas could allow for strategically minded 
presidents to increase their political fortunes at home through displays of international 
aggression.  But, the same variations in voting behavior also limits presidents’ abilities 
to obtain benefits to only legislation linked to international affairs.  Whether presidents, 
by maintaining such links, may be able to, in the long-term, re-establish their positions 
of leadership within the US (see, Richards et. al. 1993) is yet to be determined.  What 
can be determined is that members of the chamber as a whole and the opposition party, 
at such times, will pose much greater constraints on presidents concerning their 
domestic agendas.  Together, these variations in congressional voting behavior offer a 
more refined approach to explaining presidential decision-making in regards to the use 
of force as well as employing diversionary behavior.  It also leaves us to wonder if rallies 
of greater congressional support within the international arena are enough to sustain 
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presidents whose constituents may be struggling due to their constrained capacities to 
act domestically.     
 Fortunately, the relationship between Congress and presidential decisions to 
initiate violent conflicts abroad offers a viable research agenda where such questions 
can be addressed.  Future work may want to further examine how initiating uses of 
force abroad affect members of the House and Senate differently.  While some 
explanations have been presented above, an abundant of other factors not covered in 
this work may better explicate observed differences in how members of the House and 
Senate respond.  Other scholars may wish to shift the level of analysis from the 
aggregate support scores presented here to how initiating violent conflicts impact the 
voting behavior of individual members of Congress.  Here partisan, tenure, regional, 
and constituent factors, to name just a few, could provide a greater understanding of 
member decision-making than studies than aggregate studies that theoretically assume 
a monolithic Congress. Matters of timing of important votes may be the subject of future 
scholarly work.  Are votes on the president’s agenda more likely to come up in either 
chamber of Congress after initiating uses of force abroad?  Do presidents have to make 
fewer concessions to get legislation passed through Congress after initiating uses of 
force abroad?  These questions, and many others, could go a long way toward 
illuminating how inter-branch relations influence and shape membership response as 
well as presidential decision-making involving international conflict.        
 Diversionary theorists have offered a theoretical path for presidents to regain 
their positions of prominence from out of the political doldrums.  But, in their quest to 
understand and explain when presidents are most likely to use force abroad, they have 
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often failed to account for the salient post-force impacts such decisions will have on 
members of Congress.  This theoretical omission is surprising sense congressional 
members are often the president’s greatest critics and serve as the institutional origin 
for their domestic constraints.  From the evidence presented here, future diversionary 
and congressional research will benefit from further work on how members of Congress 
















Table 1.1: Dependent Variable Descriptions   
#    NAME   DISTRIBUTION  MIN  MAX 
1) Presidential Support Continuous  0  100 
 Chamber as a Whole      
         
2) Presidential Support Continuous  0  100 
           President's Party       
         
3) Presidential Support Continuous  0  100 
           Opposition Party       
         
4) Presidential Success Dichotomous  0  1 
        Simple Majority       




Table 1.2: Predicted Relationships for Baseline Model Specification, House and Senate 
Dependent Variable: 









Presidential Popularity + + +  +  
 
Unemployment - - -  -  
 
Inflation - - -  -  
 
President's Party in  + + -  +  
Chamber       
 
Chamber Ideology - - -  -  
 
Administration Year - - -  -  
 
Election Year - - -  -  
 
Foreign/Defense Policy + + +  +  
 
Use of Force 1-30 days + + +  +  
 
Use of Force 31-60 days + + +  +  
 









Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, House and Senate 1948-1993 
Chamber: House  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Chamber as a Whole  51.38  15.50  0.72  100 
          
President's Party  51.31  29.39  0  100 
          
Opposition Party  32.88  24.71  0  100 
Chamber: Senate  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Chamber as a Whole  55.53  17.33  12.82  100 
          
President's Party  59.01  28.36  0  100 
          
Opposition Party  37.12  27.16  0  100 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, House and Senate 1948-1993 
Chamber: House  Followed %  ~Followed %  Cum. 
          
President's Position  217 59.18  146 40.22  363 
Followed          
         
Chamber: Senate  Followed %  ~Followed %  Cum. 
          
President's Position  219 65.77  114 34.33  333 
Followed          
         
 
Table 3: Distribution of Congressional Support for the House and Senate, 1948-1993 
Chamber: House  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
Chamber as a Whole  12  58  207  73  13 
%   (3.31)  (15.98)  (57.02)  (20.11)  (3.58) 
            
President's Party  68  83  58  68  86 
%   (18.73)  (22.87)  (15.98)  (18.73)  (23.69) 
            
Opposition Party  143  95  68  35  22 
%   (39.39)  (26.17)  (18.73)  (9.64)  (6.06) 
Chamber: Senate           
Chamber as a Whole  6  49  165  78  35 
%   (1.80)  (14.71)  (49.55)  (23.42)  (10.51) 
            
President's Party  48  48  55  94  91 
%   (13.51)  (14.41)  (16.52)  (28.23)  (27.33) 
            
Opposition Party  103  102  61  32  35 
%   (30.93)  (30.63)  (18.32)  (9.61)  (10.51) 
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Table 4.1: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM Estimates 
  House   Senate  
Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable: c p o c p o 
Constant 69.25*** 100.38*** 93.92*** 42.67*** 34.555 75.46*** 
 (10.85) (27.09) (26.02) (16.74) (20.88) (28.19) 
 
Presidential Popularity -.034 -.031 -.034 .112 .136 -.114 
 (.0773) (.2272) (.2050) (.0996) (.1939) (.2585) 
 
Unemployment -.811** 1.235 -1.376 -.294 3.465††† -2.901*** 
 (.4327) (1.691) (.9755) (.8545) (1.030) (1.203) 
 
Inflation -.3310** 1.219†† .864†† .477 -.248 .867 
 (.1552) (.7246) (.5113) (.4189) (.7787) (.5622) 
 
President's Party in 10.563** 52.05*** -25.634*** 39.95*** 52.386*** 27.712†† 
Chamber (5.533) (17.90) (10.81) (12.39) (16.07) (16.59) 
 
Chamber Ideology -.215 -1.970*** -.973*** -.262 -.735** -.628 
 (.1548) (.4971) (.3734) (.2366) (.3709) (.4233) 
 
Administration Year -1.306*** .077 -.756 -.830 .532 -3.419** 
 (.5241) (1.428) (1.014) (.8842) (.9922) (1.693) 
 
Election Year -1.889 -1.155 3.437 -1.273 .494 6.931 
 (1.347) (5.311) (3.004) (2.798) (4.045) (6.367) 
 
Foreign/Defense Policy 2.229 -.302 4.460 2.077 -7.059†† .4.049 
 (1.971) (3.801) (3.179) (2.161) (3.112) (3.667) 
 
Use of Force 1-30 days -5.052 8.331** 3.426 -6.450†† 4.937 -10.98††† 
 (4.805) (4.861) (6.152) (3.205) (6.056) (3.707) 
 
Use of Force 31-60 days -10.68††† 4.889 -17.19††† 2..255 -.745 8.766 
 (3.792) (4.406) (2.706) (3.147) (4.500) (8.144) 
 
Use of Force 61-90 days 1.340 -6.832 6.850 -5.552 1.753 -4.402 
 (2.304) (5.457) (6.023) (4.308) (5.224) (12.829) 
N 358 358 358 330 330 330 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1766.615 -1761.237 -1597.863 -1654.558 -1672.776 -1516.602 
BIC -1987.348 -1869.966 -1785.480 -1809.978 -1716.512 -1656.888 
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at p ≤ .05 by **.  
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at p ≤ 
.05 by ††.  Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable (c) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (p) 
represents president’s party, and (o) represents opposition party. 
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Table 4.2: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM Estimates 
  House   Senate  
Model #: 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Dependent Variable: c p o C p o 
Constant 67.76*** 104.39*** 85.43*** 45.09*** 36.41** 88.86 
 (11.558) (32.561) (21.940) (17.540) (21.966) -- 
 
Presidential Popularity -.034 -.099 -.009 .125 .146 .026 
 (.0772) (.3574) (.1495) (.1023) (.2114) -- 
 
Unemployment -.621 1.401 -.690 -.328 3.60††† -3.151 
 (.4965) (1.6362) (.9480) (.8450) (.9892) -- 
 
Inflation -.335** 1.01 .713††† .468 -.300 1.114 
 (.1597) (.8883) (.2865) (.4174) (.7563) -- 
 
President's Party in 11.49** 54.30*** -20.89*** 37.28*** 50.94** 9.963 
Chamber (5.5672) (17.992) (8.9916) (13.282) (15.743) -- 
 
Chamber Ideology -.206 -2.003*** -.901*** -.285 -3769** -.868 
 (.1597) (.4864) (.3519) (.2408) (.3587) -- 
 
Administration Year -1.225*** .054 -.832 -.818 .485 -3.708 
 (.5397) (1.3793) (.9893) (.8756) (.9685) -- 
 
Election Year -2.020 -.982 3.352 -.816 1.396 9.141††† 
 (1.354) (5.3937) (2.4182) (2.7005) (4.0067) (2.9330) 
 
Foreign/Defense Policy .207 .021 -2.113 -.885 
-
9.957††† -1.665 
 (1.8243) (4.2677) (2.9949) (2.4212) (3.4608) (2.4037) 
 
Use of Force 1-30 days -7.626 7.341 -2.870 -11.55††† 1.982 -12.71††† 
 (6.0087) (8.2182) (6.5189) (4.6481) (6.9625) (.2801) 
 
Use of Force 1-30 days 7.174 1.386 18.664** 12.76*** 3.729 11.11*** 
x Foreign/Defense Policy (5.9492) (15.630) (9.4085) (5.4040) (13.790) (3.5203) 
 
Use of Force 31-60 days -13.17††† 2.224 -21.49††† 3.167 -2.139 10.25** 
 (2.7966) (5.5728) (2.9237) (4.1411) (8.0925) (5.8836) 
 
Use of Force 31-60 days 10.764 14.334 36.99*** 6.721 9.523 14.523 
x Foreign/Defense Policy (12.304) (15.155) (14.407) (12.370) (22.468) (21.675) 
 
Use of Force 61-90 days -1.543 -3.483 1.386 -8.040 -4.989 -15.08 
 (1.8467) (11.506) (5.9685) (6.1395) (6.7374) -- 
 
Use of Force 61-90 days 12.718** -13.096 22.46** 14.15** 22.51** 37.26*** 
x Foreign/Defense Policy (7.1974) (34.006) (12.507) (7.8498) (10.929) (12.741) 
 
Use of Force 30*60 days __ __ __ -.040 12.626 4.231 
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    (11.790) (24.090) (18.4731) 
Use of Force 60*90 days __ __ __ -15.95††† -12.309 -21.30††† 
    (5.9333) (10.366) (6.2333) 
N 358 358 358 330 330 330 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1766.410 -1760.982 -1760.983 -1654.029 
-
1672.109 -1492.631 
BIC -1970.152 -1853.103 -1853.103 -1782.041 
-
1688.673 -1633.260 
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at p ≤ .05 by **.  
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at p ≤ 
.05 by ††.  Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses.  The (–) in the place of 
Robust Standard Errors represent parameter estimates presented without standard errors, z-scores, and 
corresponding z-values. 
 
Dependent variable (c) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (p) 






Table 4.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 7-12    
   House   Senate  
  c p o c p o 
 Domestic/Political No Effect No Effect No Effect -11.55 No Effect -12.71 
1-30 Days Foreign/Defense No Effect No Effect 18.664 12.76 No Effect 11.11 
 Net Impact No Effect No Effect 18.664 1.21 No Effect -1.6 
        
 Domestic/Political -13.17 No Effect -21.49 No Effect No Effect 10.25 
31-60 Days Foreign/Defense No Effect No Effect 36.99 No Effect No Effect No Effect 
 Net Impact No Effect No Effect 15.5 No Effect No Effect No Effect 
        
 Domestic/Political No Effect No Effect No Effect No Effect No Effect No Effect 
61-90 Days Foreign/Defense 12.718 No Effect 22.46 14.15 22.51 37.26 
 Net Impact 12.72 No Effect 22.46 14.15 22.51 37.26 
        
Use of Force 30*60 -- -- -- No Effect No Effect No Effect 
        
Use of Force 60*90 -- -- -- -15.95 No Effect -21.30 
Dependent variable (c) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (p) 















Table 5.1: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993 Probit Estimates 
Model#:  
House 













Constant 1.048 1.033 -- -2.370 .9766*** -- 
 
Presidential Popularity 0.001 0.0073 .0002 .020 .0053*** .0073 
 
Unemployment -0.008 0.0566 -.0078 .040 .0582 .0144 
 
Inflation -0.008 0.0233 -.0033 .070 .0355†† .0252 
 
President's Party in 1.919 .7427*** .7407 3.764 .8033*** 1.3586 
Chamber       
 
Chamber Ideology -0.027 0.0168 -.0110 -.017 .0150 -.0061 
 
Administration Year -0.096 .0445** -.0369 -.008 .0557 -.0028 
 
Election Year -0.172 0.1646 -.0660 -.103 .1708 --.0371 
 
Foreign/Defense Policy 0.129 0.1854 .0493 .087 .1562 .0313 
 
Use of Force 1-30 Days -0.286 0.2002 -.1126 .034 .2751 .0121 
 
Use of Force 31-60 Days -0.543 0.4069 -.2139 .289 .2547 .0976 
 
Use of Force 61-90 Days 0.223 0.319 .0832 -.642 .2467††† -.2474 
N 358   330   
Wald Χ² 33.99***   51.84***   
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 62.57%   68.48%   
Proportionate Reduction 
of Error 7.59%   7.13%   
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at p ≤ .05 by **.  
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at p ≤ 
.05 by ††.  Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses.  The (–) in the place of 














Table 5.2: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993 Probit Estimates 
  House   Senate  










Constant .840 1.020 -- -2.465 .9796*** -- 
 
Presidential Popularity .001 .072 .0006 .021 .0064*** .0077 
 
Unemployment -.013 .0562 -.0049 .040 .0531 .0144 
 
Inflation -.007 .0229 -.0028 .068 .0350†† .0246 
 
President's Party in 2.024 .7131*** .7808 3.821 .7954*** 1.3725 
Chamber       
 
Chamber Ideology -.026 .0167 -.0100 -.017 .0155 -.0061 
 
Administration Year -.085 .0426** -.0326 .003 .0518 .0011 
 
Election Year -.195 .1659 -.0751 -.075 .1584 -.0271 
 
Foreign/Defense Policy -.009 .2001 -.0033 -.067 .1942 -..0241 
 
Use of Force 1-30 days -.692 .2600††† -.2705 -.225 .3567 -.0840 
 
Use of Force 1-30 days 1.137 .3091*** .3246 .716 .6009 .2061 
x Foreign/Defense Policy       
 
Use of Force 31-60 days -.582 .4338 -.2288 .363 .2984 .1190 
 
Use of Force 31-60 days .126 .6740 .0477 -- -- -- 
x Foreign/Defense Policy       
 
Use of Force 61-90 days .092 .3009 .0349 -.805 .3662†† -.3101 
 
Use of Force 61-90 days .540 .6214 .1853 1.100 .6149** .2703 
x Foreign/Defense Policy       
N 358   330   
Wald Χ² 88.17***   82.63***   
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 61.73%   68.52%   
Proportionate Reduction 
of Error 4.92%   6.43%   
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at p ≤ .05 by **.  
Significance at p ≤ .01 (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at p ≤ 








Table 5.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 15-16   
   House   Senate  
   
Simple 
Majority   
Simple 
Majority  
 Domestic/Political  -.2705   No Effect  
1-30 Days Foreign/Defense  .3091   No Effect  
 Net Impact  .0386   No Effect  
        
 Domestic/Political  No Effect   No Effect  
31-60 Days Foreign/Defense  No Effect   No Effect  
 Net Impact  No Effect   No Effect  
        
 Domestic/Political  No Effect   -.3101  
61-90 Days Foreign/Defense  No Effect   .6149  





























Table 6: Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data on OLS Models   
  House   Senate  
Dependent Variables Baseline  Interaction Baseline  Interaction
Chamber as Whole (c) 0.993**  0.986*** 0.988***  0.964*** 
       
President's Party (p) 0.974***  0.974*** 0.989**  0.989** 
       
Opposition Party (o) 0.983***  0.956*** 0.992*  0.970*** 
Significance at p ≤ .01 denoted by ***, at p ≤ .05 by **, and p ≤ .10 by *. 
Reported values represent each model’s “W” test statistic.   
 
Table 6 presents the results for tests to determine whether or not OLS regression 
is an appropriate statistical method to use for my data.  From the displayed results it is 
apparent that it is not appropriate to employ OLS regression.  Using a Shapiro-Wilk W 
Test for Normal Data, I find that the “W” test statistic for each of model’s error term is 
statistically significant from 0.  This allows me to reject the null hypothesis that each 
model’s error term is distributed normally.  Failure to find normally distributed error 
terms means that all twelve models violate OLS regression’s underlying assumption of 
normality (Gujerati 2004 pp. 337-339).  Without meeting this assumption, I am unable to 
obtain efficient and consistent parameter estimates for my independent variables using 
OLS regression.         
82 
REFERENCES 
Abramowitz, Alan I. and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1992. Senate elections. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
 
Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. 1989. Foreign affairs and issue 
voting: Do presidential candidates 'waltz before a blind audience.’ American 
Political Science Review  83:123-141. 
 
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why parties. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Bartels, Larry M. 1991. Constituency opinion and congressional policy making: The 
Reagan defense build up. The American Political Science Review 85(2): 457-
474. 
 
Binder, Sara A. 1999. The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947-96. American Political 
Science Review  93(3): 519-533. 
 
Brady, David W., Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John F. Cogan. 2000. Out of step, out of 
office: Legislative voting behavior and House election outcomes. In Change and 
Continuity in House Elections, eds. D. Brady, J. Cogan, and J. Ferejohn. 
Stanford University Press.  
 
Brady, David W., John F. Cogan, Brian J. Gaines, and Douglas Rivers. 1996. The perils 
of presidential support: How the Republicans took the House in the 1994 midterm 
elections. Political Behavior 18(3): 345-367. 
 
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2004. Hypothesis testing and multiplicative interaction terms. 
International Organization 58: 807-820. 
 
Brulé, David. 2006. Congressional opposition, the economy, and U.S. dispute initiation, 
1946-2000. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4): 463-483. 
 
Campbell, James E. 1993. The presidential pulse of congressional elections. Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky.  
 
Clark, David H. 2000. Agreeing to disagree: Domestic institutional congruence and U.S. 
dispute behavior. Political Research Quarterly  53(2): 375-400. 
 
Clark, David H. 2003. Can strategic interaction divert diversionary behavior? A model of 
U.S. conflict propensity. Journal of Politics 65(4):1013-1039. 
 
Clark, David H. and Timothy Nordstrom. 2005. Democratic variants and democratic 
variance: How domestic constraints shape interstate conflict. The Journal of 
Politics 67(1): 250-270. 
 
83 
Coser, Lewis A. 1956. The function of social conflict. New York: Free Press. 
 
Crespi, Irving. 1980. The case of presidential popularity. In Polling on the issues, edited 
by A. H. Cantril, 28-45. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks. 
 
Dassel, Kurt and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. Domestic strife and the initiation of violence at 
home and abroad. American Journal of Political Science 43(1): 56-85. 
 
Davies, Graeme A. M. 2002. Domestic strife and the initiation of international conflict: A 
directed dyad analysis, 1950-1982. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 672-692. 
 
DeRouen Karl and Peake Jeffrey. 2002. The dynamics of diversion: The domestic 
implications of presidential use of force. International Interactions 28(2): 191-211. 
 
DeRouen, Karl. 1995. The indirect links: Politics, the economy, and the use of force. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(4) 671-695. 
 
DeRouen, Karl. 2000.  Presidents and the diversionary use of force: A research note. 
International Studies Quarterly 44(2): 317-328. 
 
DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo. 2000. Defense contracting and domestic politics. Political 
Research Quarterly 53: 753-769. 
 
Edwards, George C. III. 2003. On deaf ears: The limits of the bully pulpit. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.  
 
Edwards, George C. III, and Tami Swenson. 1997. Who rallies? The anatomy of a rally 
event. The Journal of Politics 9(1): 200-212. 
 
Edwards, George C. III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. The legislative impact 
of divided government. American Journal of Political Science 41:  
545-563. 
 
Erikson, Robert. 1989. Economic conditions and the presidential vote. American 
Political Science Review 83: 567-573. 
 
Fiorina, Morris. P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Fiorina, Morris. 1983. Who is held responsible?  Further evidence on the Hibbing Afford 
Thesis. American Journal of Political Science 27(1): 158-164. 
 
Fleisher, Richard and Jon R. Bond. 1998. Are there two presidencies? Yes, but only for 
Republicans. The Journal of Politics 50(3): 747-767. 
 
84 
Foster, Dennis M. and Glenn Palmer. 2006. Presidents, public opinion, and diversionary 
behavior: The role of partisan support reconsidered. Foreign Policy Analysis 2: 
269-287. 
 
Fordham, Benjamin. 1998a. The politics of threat perception and use of force: A political 
economy model of U.S. uses of force, 1949-1994. International Studies Quarterly 
42(3): 567-590. 
 
Fordham, Benjamin. 1998b. Partisanship, macroeconomic policy, and U.S. uses of 
force, 1949-1994. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(4): 418-439. 
 
Fordham, Benjamin. 2002. Another look at parties, voters, and the uses of force abroad. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(4): 572-596. 
 
Fordham Benjamin. 2004. A very sharp sword: The influence of military capabilities on 
American decisions to use force. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(5): 632-656. 
 
Greene, William. 2003. Econometric analysis. 5th Ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.  
 
Gronke, Paul, Jeffrey Koch, and J. Matthew Wilson. 2003. Follow the leader?  
Presidential approval, presidential support, and representatives’ electoral 
fortunes. The Journal Politics 65(3): 785-808. 
 
Grosclose, Tim, Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder. 1999. Comparing interest 
group scores across time and chambers. American Political Science Review 
93(1): 33-50. 
 
Hibbs, Douglas. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political 
Science Review 1: 1467-1487. 
 
Howell WG and JC Pevehouse. 2005. Presidents, congress, and the use of force. 
International Organization 59(1): 209-232. 
 
Huckley, Ronald H. 1988. Public attitudes toward key foreign policy events. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 32: 295-318. 
 
Hurwitz, Jon and Mark Peffley. 1987. How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A 
hierarchical model. American Political Science Review 81: 1099-1120. 
 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1997. The politics of congressional elections. New York: Longman. 
 
Jentleson, Bruce and Rebecca Britton. 1998. Still pretty prudent: Post Cold War 
American public opinion on the use of military force. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 42(4): 395-417. 
 
85 
Jones, David R. and Monika L. McDermott. 2004. Responsible party government model 
in House and Senate elections. American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 1-
12. 
 
Kingdom, John W. 1981. Congressmen’s voting decisions, 2nd ed. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
 
Krause, George A. 2000. Partisan and ideological sources of fiscal deficits in the United 
States. American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 541-559. 
 
Leblang, David and Steven Chan. 2003. Explaining wars fought by established 
democracies: Do institutional constraints matter? Political Research Quarterly 
56(4): 385-400.  
 
Lee, Jong R. 1977. Rallying around the flag: Foreign policy events and presidential 
popularity. Presidential Studies Quarterly 7: 252-256. 
 
Leeds, Brett Ashley and David Davis. 1997. Domestic political vulnerability and 
international disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 814-834. 
 
Lian, Bradley and John Oneal. 1993. Presidents, the use of force and public opinion. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 277-300. 
 
Lindsay, James M. 1994. Congress, foreign policy and the new institutionalism. 
International Studies Quarterly 38: 281-304. 
 
MacKuen, Michael, Robert Erikson, and James Stimon. 1992. Peasants or bankers?  
The American electorate and the U.S. economy. American Political Science 
Review 86: 597-611. 
 
Marra, Robin F. and Charles W. Ostrom. 1989. Explaining seat change in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. American Journal of Political Science 33(3): 541-569. 
 
Marra, Robin F., Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis M. Simon. 1990. Foreign policy 
and presidential popularity: Creating windows of opportunity in the perpetual 
election. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(4): 588-623. 
 
Marra, Robin F., Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis M. Simon. 1989.  Foreign policy in 
the perpetual election. Paper prepared for the Joint Annual Convention of British 
International Studies Association and the International Studies Association, 
London.   
 
Meernik, James. 1993. Presidential support in Congress: Conflict and consensus on 
foreign and defense policy. The Journal of Politics 55(3): 569-587. 
 
86 
Meernik, James. 2001. Domestic politics and the political use of military force by the 
United States. Political Research Quarterly 54(4): 889-904. 
 
Meernik, James and Elizabeth Oldmixon. 2004. Internationalism in Congress. Political 
Research Quarterly 57(3): 451-465. 
 
Meernik, James and Peter Waterman. 1996. The myth of diversionary use of force by 
American presidents. Political Research Quarterly 49(3): 573-590. 
 
Miller, Ross. 1995. Domestic structures and the diversionary use of force. American 
Journal of Political Science 39: 760-785. 
 
Miller, Ross. 1999. Domestic structures interaction, and the diversionary use of force. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 388-402. 
 
Morgan, Clifton T. and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. Domestic discontent and the external 
use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 25-52. 
 
Muller, John. 1973. Wars, presidents and public opinion. New York: Wiley.  
 
Neusstadt, Richard E. 1960. Presidential power. New York: Wiley. 
 
Nincic, Mirolsav. 1997. Domestic costs, U.S. public, and the isolationist calculus. 
International Studies Quarterly 41(4): 593-609. 
 
Nincic, Miroslav, and Barbara Hinkley. 1991. Foreign policy and the evaluation of 
presidential candidates. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 333-355. 
 
Ostrom, Charles W. Jr. and Brian L. Job. 1986. The president and the political use of 
force. American Political Science Review 80: 541-566.  
 
Patrick, James, and John R. Oneal. 1991. The influence of domestic and international 
politics on the president’s use of force. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35(2): 
307-332. 
 
Powlick, Philip J. and Andrew Katz. 1998. Defining the American public opinion/foreign 
policy nexus. Mershon International Studies Review 42(1): 29-61. 
 
Reiter, Dan and Erik Tillman. 2002. Public, legislative and executive constraints on the 
democratic initiation of conflict. Journal of Politics 54: 810-826. 
 
Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry 
Young. 1993. Good times, bad times, and the diversionary use of force: A tale of 
some not so free agents. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(3): 504-535. 
 
87 
Rivers, Douglas and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. Passing the president’s program: Public 
opinion and presidential influence in congress. American Journal of Political 
Science 29(2) 183-196. 
 
Samuels, David. 2004. Presidentialism and accountability for the economy in 
comparative perspective. American Political Science Review 98: 425-436. 
 
Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. 
American Political Science Review 92: 829-844. 
 
Simmel, George. 1955. Conflict and the web of group affiliations. Glencoe, IL: Free 
Press 
 
Smith, Alastair. 1996. Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. International 
Studies Quarterly 40: 133-153.  
 
Smith, Alastair. 1999. Testing theories of strategic choice: The example of crisis 
escalation. American Journal of Political Science 43: 1254-1283. 
 
StataCorp. 2005. Base reference manual 9 vol. 1-3. College Station, TX: Stata Press. 
 
Stoll, Richard. 1987. The sound of the guns: Is there a congressional rally effect after 
U.S. military action? American Politics Quarterly 15: 223-237. 
 
Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision making in political systems: Veto players in 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism, and multipartyism. British 
Journal of Political Science 25: 289-325. 
 
Wang, Kevin H. 1996. Presidential responses to foreign policy crises. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40: 68-97. 
 
Wildasvsky, Aaron. 1966. The two presidencies. Reprinted in Steven Shull, ed., The 
Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment. Chicago: Nelson Hall.  
 
 
 
